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Burnett et al.: Federal Practice & Procedure

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF INTERNAL MILITARY DECISIONS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT ADOPTS MINDES AND
ECONOMOU

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Wallace v. Chappell,! the Ninth Circuit adopted the
Mindes 2 standard for judicial reviewability of internal administrative military decisions. The court held that violations of military personnel's "recognized"s constitutional rights, arising from
internal military decisions, entitles them to a district court determination of whether such claims can be judicially reviewed.
Once found reviewable, the military official charged will generally· enjoy qualified immunity for acts performed in good faith.
Before seeking judicial review, plaintiffs must also demonstrate
exhaustion of available intraservice remedies. &
This action originated when five black enlisted men charged
their superior officers with racial discrimination. The coinplaint
alleged that the defendants had assigned plaintiffs to the least
desirable duties, had excluded them from training programs, had
given them low performance evaluations, and had excessively
punished them for minor transgressions. Plaintiffs claimed viola1. 661 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Fletcher, J.; the other panel members were
Goodwin, J., and Hug, J.), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 486 (1982).
2. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
3. "Recognized", as a qualification upon the Mindes test was established in Calhoun
v. United States, 475 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 604 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1078 (1980). The Calhoun court used this term because many so-called
"constitutional violations" are nothing more than ordinary torts to which state tort law
or the Federal Tort Claims Act applies. 475 F. Supp. at 5. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424
U.S. 693 (1976); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
4. The term "generally" is used here because, as the court observed, the possibility
of absolute immunity exists if the official charged can demonstrate performance of "special functions". 661 F.2d at 735. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 508 (1978). See
also text accompanying notes 65-71 infra.
5. 661 F.2d at 738.
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tions of both the equal protection component of the fifth amendment due process clauses and 42 U.S.C. section 1985(3).7
The district court held that internal military decisions are
nonreviewable; that defendants' absolute immunity protected
them from liability even if reviewable; and, that plaintiffs had
failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Ninth Circuit reversed, distinguishing the two basic substantive issues
presented: judicial reviewability of internal military decisions,
and official immunity if found reviewable. s The court observed
that if the military decision involved is found nonreviewable, the
immunity issue is moot. s If the military decision is found reviewable, however, the immunity question arises only when an individual officer is, as here, sued for money damages. 1o After determining that the instant action satisfied both substantive
questions, the case was remanded to the district court for reconsideration to determine whether plaintiffs' claims satisfied the
Mindes standard.
6. 1d. at 730 n.l. Technically, the constitutional violation for which the officers were
charged was fifth amendment due process. The reason plaintiffs did not sue under the
fourteenth amendment was that, heretofor in damage suits, only alleged violations of the
fourth and fifth amendments have been recognized. See supra note 3, infra note 10.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1981) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire
... for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly,
any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or
for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to
all persons within such State or Territory, the equal protection of the laws;. . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this
section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to
be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived
may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by
such injury or deprivation, against anyone or more of the
conspirators.
8. 661 F.2d at 731.
9. 1d. at 734.
10. The question arises whether the type of injury sustained by plaintiffs is normally compensable in damages. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which the Supreme Court held that an
aggrieved party may bring a damages action against federal officials based directly on
violations of the fourth amendment. Bivens was extended to fifth amendment equal protection claims in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
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Because of the Ninth Circuit's holding, the court did not
rule on the exhaustion issue, but' stated that upon remand,
plaintiffs must demonstrate that they had exhausted available
intraservice remedies before trial could proceed. 11
B.

BACKGROUND

Reviewability

The starting point for considering the question of judicial
reviewability of administrative decisions is Orloff v. Willoughby,12 where the Supreme Court held that it had no power
to review a military determination regarding duty assignments. IS
The Willoughby opinion expressed the basic policy concerns behind the doctrine of nonreviewability. In a frequently quoted
passage, the Court stated:
[J]udges are not given the task of running the
Army. The responsibility for setting up channels
through which such grievances can be considered
and fairly settled rests upon the Congress and
upon the President of the United States and his
subordinates. . . . Orderly government requires
that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army
must be scrupulous not to intervene in judicial
matters. 14

The Willoughby rule lll illustrates two widely held policy
concerns present in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries. Primarily, the rule represents the principle of sep11. 661 F.2d at 738.
12. 345 U.S. 83 (1953). The Willoughby case arose out of the doctor shortage during
the Korean War. Orloff, a doctor who had been inducted under the Doctor's Draft Law,
Universal Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 454(i) (1981), brought a
habeas corpus action to require assignment to medical duties which the Army refused
because of Orloff's unwillingness to answer questions regarding his previous affiliation
with the Communist Party.
13. 345 U.s. at 91. The Court's decision was stated in absolute terms: "[I)t is not
within the power of this Court by habeas corpus to determine whether specific assignments to duty fall within the basic classification of petitioner. . . . [W)e have found no
case where this Court has assumed to revise duty orders as to one lawfully in the service." Id. at 93-94.
14.Id.
15. The doctrine of nonreviewability for administrative military decisions will hereinafter be referred to as the "Willoughby rule". For an excellent discussion on the preMindes doctrine of nonreviewability, see Montgomery, God, The Army and Judicial Review: The In-service Conscientious Objector, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 379 (1968).
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aration of powers. In 1857, in Dynes v. Hoover,16 the Supreme
Court held that under Articles I and II of the Constitution,17
military courts were agencies of the Executive and Legislative
branches, not the Judiciary.18
The second underlying policy concern was the necessity of
military autonomy to maintain internal discipline and order. In
the 1840 case of Decatur v. Paulding,IS the Supreme Court
stated: "The interference of the courts with the performance of
the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government, would be productive of nothing but mischief .... "20
Considering the well established "hands off" attitude of the
federal judiciary, it becomes easier to understand why the courts
have been reluctant to review military decisions. This attitude
was crystallized in the Willoughby decision.
Since Willoughby however, this crystallization has steadily
eroded, and the courts have become more willing to review military decisions. In Harmon v. Brucker,21 the Supreme Court dramatically departed from the Willoughby rule. The Harmon
Court held that the federal courts do have jurisdiction to review
administrative discharge actions to determine whether the Secretary of the Army has acted in excess of his statutory authority.12 The Court stated: "Generally, judicial relief is available to
one who has been injured by an act of a government official
which is in excess of his express or implied powers."28 Although
16. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
17. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 provides: "The President shall be Commander in Chief of

the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 empowers the Congress "To declare War. . . ; To raise and support Armies . . . ; To provide
and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces .... "
18. "[Clivil courts have nothing to do [with military courtsl, nor are they in any way
alterable by them." 61 U.S. (20 How.) at 82. For a more detailed discussion of this concept, see Barker, Military Law-A Separate System of Jurisprudence, 36 U. elN. L.
REV. 223 (1967).
19. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840).
20. Id. at 515. See also United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291 (1842), in

which the Supreme Court unanimously held that it is not the prerogative of the federal
courts to review the validity of Army regulations.
21. 355 U.S. 579 (1958).
22. Id. at 582.
23. Id. at 581-82. The Court relied on American School of Magnetic Healing v.
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this decision involved a discharge action, it opened the door to
judicial intervention, thereby enlarging the court's scope of reviewability of military actions.
But before judicial intervention in non-discharge administrative actions could be justified, review of discharge actions required greater development. The link between discharge and
non-discharge determinations was provided in Hammond v.
Lenfest,24 in which the Second Circuit held that a serviceman is
entitled to a federal court review of a military administrative decision concerning a request for discharge. 211 Even though this
holding was restricted to its facts, it has been applied by analogy
in at least one non-discharge case, Smith v. Resor.26 In that case,
the court held that plaintiff was entitled to review of unsatisfactory attendance ratings. 27
With regard to military decisions concerning orders, duty
assignments, personnel status and other non-discharge administrative determinations however, the Willoughby rule was still
closely followed. It was not until Mindes v. Seaman 28 that there
came a true break with the tradition of Willoughby.
The two-part Mindes test provides a standard by which a
trial court may consider the relevant factors to determine
whether the particular claim warrants judicial review. Initially, a
military decision is nonreviewable unless plaintiff alleges: (1) a
violation of a constitutional right, applicable statute, or military
regulation, and, (2) the exhaustion of available intraservice
remedies. 29
McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94 (1902). The McAnnulty decision-a major departure from
Dynes and Decatur-held that, in the absence of statutory prohibition, an administrative determination is reviewable. [d. at 108. See supra text accompanying notes 16-20.
24. 398 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1968). Hammond, a Navy reservist, filed for a conscientious objector discharge which was denied. He then applied for a writ of habeas corpus in
the district court which was also denied, the court claiming lack of jurisdiction. The
Second Circuit reversed.
25. [d. at 715.
26. 406 F.2d 141 (2d Cir. 1969).
27. [d. at 146-47.
28. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971). Mindes, an Air Force captain, received an unfavorable and erroneous Officer Effectiveness Report which resulted in his separation from
active duty. After exhausting available intraservice remedies, ending in denial of relief,
he sought correction in the district court. [d. at 198.
29. [d. at 201; Wallace, 661 F.2d at 732.
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The second step requires that the trial court weigh four factors to determine whether review should be granted:
(1) The nature and strength of plaintiff's claim. As the
Mindes Court recognized, constitutional claims generally carry greater weight than statutory or regulatory
claims. But even constitutional claims can vary widely,
and tenuous constitutional challenges should be
weighed against review. so
(2) The potential injury to plaintiff if review is refused. s1
(3) The extent of interference with military functions.
Some degree of interference will always exist, but this
fact alone should not bar review. If however, the extent of interference should seriously impede the ability
of the military to perform its functions, then review
should be denied.81
(4) The extent to which military expertise or discretion is
involved. In such matters as promotions and orders directly related to military functions, deference should
be given to the superior knowledge of the military.ss
The Mindes test had been applied although not expressly
adopted by the Ninth Circuit prior to Wallace. In Schlanger u.
United States,S4 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court decision which, after applying the Mindes test, denied review and
dismissed the complaint on other grounds. In Glines u. Wade,slI
the court recognized that the test had been considered in
Schlanger, and that if it was controlling, plaintiff would satisfy
it.
Immunity

An issue separate from reviewability is that of official immunity. The Ninth Circuit in Wallace was careful to distinguish
30. 453 F.2d at 201.
31. [d.
32. [d.
33. [d. at 201-02.
34. 586 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979). The Ninth Circuit recognized the potential applicability of Mindes in Schlanger, but rejected the test
because the same result could be reached by denying review of all military decisions
involving duty assignments. See 661 F.2d at 733 n.4; Ct. Arnheifer v. Chafee, 435 F.2d
691 (9th Cir. 1970).
35. 586 F.2d 675 n.4. (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Brown v.
Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
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between the two issues since the immunity issue becomes relevant only after the action has been found reviewable. 36 The
question of official immunity has arisen in various contexts,37
thus it was often difficult for the courts to ascertain whether
greater immunity protected one but perhaps not another official.
This question has been largely answered by the Supreme Court
decision of Butz v. Economou,3B which held that federal officials
exercising discretion enjoy only qualified immunity from liability
for constitutional violations. 89
To appreciate better the Economou decision however, a discussion of the history preceding it is necessary. The Supreme
Court's first opportunity to consider the question of sovereign
immunity4° came in 1896 in Spalding v. Vilas. 41 The traditional
rationale behind sovereign immunity was that the authority empowered with making the law should not, without its consent, be
subject to the legal rights created by it.4I The Court granted to
the Postmaster General absolute immunity while acting within
the scope of his authority.43
The notion of sovereign immunity became further engraved
into the common law in Feres v. United States. 44 This case
36. 661 F.2d at 734.
37. See, e.g., GibBon v. Reynolds, 172 F.2d 95 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925
(1949) (state Director of Selective Service and local Draft Board members immune);
Laughlin v. Rosenman, 163 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (Special COUDsel to President and
Special Assistant to the Attorney General immune from malicious prosecution); Glasa v.
Ickes, 117 F.2d 273 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 718 (1941) (Secretary of Interior immune from defamation suit); Lang v. Wood, 92 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir. 1937) (Attorney General, parole board, warden and director of prison immune from liability for denial of hearing by entire parole board and plaintiff's subsequent imprisonment because
of parole revocation).
38. 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
39. [d. at 5()()-01.
40. Sovereign immunity is a common law principle which protects governmental entities from suit without their consent. It is absolute and defeats a suit at its inception for
lack of jurisdiction. See, e.g., High-Grade Oil Co. v. Sommer, 295 N.W.2d 736, 737, 739
(1980).
41. 161 U.S. 483 (1896). The Postmaster General was sued for defamation for maliciously distributing a circular to injure plaintiff's busine88. The Court found that the
circular was factually accurate and was i88ued within the scope of the official's authority.
[d. at 499.
42. See, e.g., Kawanannakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (1907) (sovereign is exempt
from suit because there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law
on which the right depends).
43. Spalding, 161 U.S. at 499.
44. 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
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arose after the passage of the Federal Tort Claims Act,·11 which
allowed private citizens to seek relief from the United States for
torts committed against them by government officials. The Feres
Court recognized that the purpose of the Act was to help "mitigate unjust consequences of sovereign immunity from suit."·8
But the Court found that the Act was not intended to extend to
military personnel for torts committed against them by their
superiors,·? thereby creating a military exception to liability.
The Feres Court offered several justifications for its rule of
absolute immunity. Primarily, it believed that a comprehensive
system of relief already existed which adequately provided for
wrongs committed against military and naval personnel.·8 The
Court observed further that while acting in the line of duty, a
military official should not be held accountable for injuries
which might occur incident to service.·" Finally, the Court found
persuasive the fact that states generally do not permit members
of the state militia to maintain tort actions for injuries suffered
incident to service. llo
Courts have approached the question of immunity for federal officials exercising discretionary functions ll1 with great trepidation. The fundamental theory of erring on the side of providing too much protection rather than not enough has evidenced
itself repeatedly in federal court decisions. The Supreme Court
decision of Barr v. Matteo lli is no exception. One important aspect evidencing the embryonic trend away from absolute immunity lies in t.he fact that the Barr decision was reached by a plurality, rather than a majority. Nevertheless, the Court granted
45. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504, 2110, 2401, 2402,
2411, 2412, 2671, 2672, 2674-80 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
46. 340 U.S. at 139.
47. [d. at 140.
48. [d.
49. [d. at 144.
50. [d. at 142.
51. A discretionary function generally is one involving judgment, planning or policy
decisions. See, e.g., Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 737 (10th Cir. 1977); Estrada v. Hills,
401 F. Supp; 429, 436 (N.D. Ill. 1975). See also Ove Gustavson Contracting Co. v. Floete,
299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962) in which the Second Circuit stated that the test for
discretion is: "was the act complained of the result of a judgment or decision which it is
nece88ary that the governmental official be free to make without fear or threat of vexatious or fictitious suits and alleged personal liability?"
52. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
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absolute immunity from suit to a lower echelon federal executive
official exercising discretion, for defamation committed while
acting within the outer perimeter of his authority, and with malicious motives. liS
Absolute immunity for common law torts was extended to
military officials as well in Barr's companion case, Howard v.
Lyons. 1l4 In that case, the Supreme Court granted absolute immunity to a Navy captain exercising discretionary functions, because his actions were performed in the "discharge of [his]
official duties. "1111
Although absolute immunity was granted to federal officials
for alleged common law torts, the same was not necessarily true
for alleged constitutional violations. In Dinsman v. Wilkes,1I6 the
Supreme Court allowed only qualified immunity from liability in
connection with an internal military decision. In this century,
the landmark case concerning alleged constitutional violations
by federal officials is Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. 1I7 In Bivens, the Supreme
Court held that the FBI's violation of a person's fourth amendment rights could be compensated with damages. 1I8 A cause of
action therefore exists against federal officials for deprivation of
constitutional rights. Although the Supreme Court did not rule
on the immunity question, on remand the Second Circuit held
that the agents were entitled only to a qualified immunity when
acting in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the legality
53. [d. at 572-75. In Barr, the acting Director of the Federal Office of Rent Stabili- .
zation was sued by its employees for defamatory statements. In a strong dissent, Justice
Brennan criticized the majority for its lack of justification on this ruling which deprived
private citizens of any opportunity to seek redress. [d. at 586-91.
54. 360 U.S. 593 (1959).
55. [d. at 598. The defendant in Howard, the commander of the Boston Naval Shipyard, circulated a letter claiming dissatisfaction with the Federal Employees Veterans
Association. Civilian members of the Association sued for defamation, claiming that circulating the letter to parties outside the Navy was an abusive act of his official duties.
The Supreme Court disagreed, granting defendant absolute immunity from suit.
56. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390 (1851). In Dinsman, a marine brought suit against his
commanding officer for "punishment inflicted upon him for refusing to do his duty." [d.
at 402. The Court held that acts motivated "by an upright intention to maintain the
discipline of command" are not actionable. [d. at 404. Therefore, qualified immunity
applied to a defendant acting in good faith, i.e., with an "upright intention."
57. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
58. [d. at 397. See supra note 10.
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of the arrest. IIi
Qualified immunity for state executive officials became the
standard after Scheuer v. Rhodes. 60 Qualified immunity affords
less protection than absolute immunity in that, while still a complete defense, it is only granted if the official charged can prove
that he acted reasonably and in good faith under the totality of
the circumstances as they appeared at the time of the act. The
official must also prove that he performed the actions in the
course of his official conduct. 61 Absolute immunity, on the other
hand, protects an official after a showing that he acted within
the scope of his authority. The Court in Scheuer established a
standard of qualified immunity to be applied to state executive
officials. The Court explained:
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the
scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably
appeared at the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. 8S

The Bivens/Scheuer line of cases provide a model for determining the level of immunity to be granted to federal executive
officials who violate constitutional rights, but no per se rule was
created. When the question arose in Economou, the Supreme
Court responded by establishing a standard of qualified immunity for alleged constitutional violations. 6s Adopting the same
rationale as Scheuer, the Court approved qualified immunity as
the rule rather than the exception, making consistent the level
of immunity to be applied to both state and federal executive
officials. 64
59. 456 F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972).
60. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
61. [d. at 247-48.
62. [d. at 247.
63. 438 U.S. 478, 507. The decision did not go unchallenged. Justice Rehnquist vehemently dissented, claiming that the Court's distinction between constitutional violations and common law torts was of questionable logic. He believed the fundamental issue
was not that distinction, rather it was the basic policy justifications for official immunity,
allowing Federal officials to perform their duties with diligence, unhindered. [d. at 51921. Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Stewart and Justice
Stevens. [d. at 517-30.
64. [d. at 507-08.
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While fixing the standard of official immunity at qualified,
the Court recognized that such a standard could not be applied
to all cases. Therefore, an exception was created, relying on a
functional approach. 611 The Economou "special functions" exception affords absolute immunity to federal officials in certain
cases where it is "essential for the conduct of public business."66
The exception grants absolute immunity to certain federal officials such as judges, prosecutors, and their administrative
counterparts. 67
One final step was required to establish precedent to apply
the Economou rule to military officials. This was provided by
the Eighth Circuit decision of Tigue v. Swaim. 68 That court held
that the military officer's immunity was subject to the same
qualified immunity standard of Economou, rejecting the argument that military officials automatically fall within the "special
functions" exception of Economou. 69 Rather, the court looked at
the particular functions of each officer, his or her immunity at
common law, and the interests sought to be protected. 70 After
applying this analysis, the Eighth Circuit determined that the
defendant was indeed performing a special function, and was
therefore granted absolute immunity.71 Thus, qualified immunity has become the standard for alleged constitutional violations by federal military officials exercising discretionary
functions.
65. Id. at 508-17.
66. Id. at 507-10. A finding of a "special function" requires an inquiry into the par·
ticular function of the defendant and the level of immunity historically accorded the
individual at common law. Id.
67. Id. at 508-17.

68. 585 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1978). Tigue, an Air Force captain, sued his superior of·
ficer for libel and false imprisonment. The action stemmed from plaintiff's removal from
a program involving access to nuclear weapons. Defendant, the Base Hospital Com·
mander and Medical Staff Advisor, was responsible for Tigue's evaluation and subse·
quent exclusion from the program.
69. Id. at 914.

70.Id.

71. Id. at 914-15. For an informative discussion of Economou and its effect on the
immunity of military officials, see Burgess, Official Immunity and Civil Liability For
Constitutional Torts Committed by Military Commanders After Butz v. Economou, 89
MIL. L. REV. 25 (1980).
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THE COURT'S ANALYSIS

Reviewability

The Ninth Circuit in Wallace began its analysis with the
question: which military decisions are reviewable, and which are
not?72 The court recognized that this issue involves many conflicting policy considerations and that any test adopted for determining reviewability must reflect a careful balancing of those
considerations. 78 The primary consideration, the court observed,
is when constitutional violations are involved. Both the individual and society as a whole have a deep interest in deterring the
unconstitutional conduct of a federal official,74
When the plaintiff is in the military however, there are
other policy factors to consider. The principal factor which must
be taken into account is that of military autonomy, or separation
of powers.711 The basic concern of the courts in the past has been
that judicial review might usurp the military in the performance
of its functions. Consequently, the military is an area that the
courts have traditionally been reluctant to enter.78
Courts have justified this reluctance on several grounds.
Civil litigation can be disruptive to military operations. 77 Service
personnel often lack time, money, and means of procuring witnesses. 78 Maintaining discipline can be difficult if litigation is
permitted. 79 And finally, as noted by the Supreme Court,
"judges are not given the task of running the Army. "80
72. 661 F.2d at 731-32.
73. 1d. See supra text accompanying notes 14-23.
74.1d.
75. 1d. See also Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 199 (6th Cir. 1971).
76. 661 F.2d at 732; Mindes v. Seaman, 463 F.2d at 199; Orloff v. Willoughby, 345
U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953).
77. 661 F.2d at 732. See also United State8 v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 112 (1954)
(granting relief under the Federal Tort Claims Act to a discharged veteran for negligent
hospital treatment).
78. 661 F.2d at 732. See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 145 (1950).
79. 661 F.2d at 732. See, e.g., Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431
U.S. 666, 671-72 (1977) (United States immune from third party indemnity actions for
damages); United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. at 112; Calhoun v. United States, supra note
3, at 3.
80. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. at 93. See supra text accompanying note 15. But
see Vance v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 826, 833 (N.D. Texas 1977) ("The desire of the
judiciary to avoid entanglement in military administration is strong, but no court today
can avoid reasoned analysis of a serious constitutional claim under the catchphrase that
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Given the conflict of the various policy considerations, the
Ninth Circuit adopted the Mindes 81 approach "when constitutional claims are asserted."82 The Mindes test, the Ninth Circuit
observed, provides an adequate basis for determining when a
military decision should be reviewed. It also fairly regards those
policy considerations militating against review. 8s The court declined to rule on whether the Mindes test should also apply to
nonconstitutional claims however,84 in favor of restricting a potentially overbroad ruling.
One restriction the court placed on its decision was a qualification upon the nature of the constitutional claim alleged. The
Ninth Circuit held that only "recognized" constitutional claims
will receive consideration under its test. 811 "Recognized", as used
by the court, means not only those claims accepted by the courts
as constitutional, but also claims which amount to more than a
traditional state law claim. 86 The court stressed the importance
of the qualification because of the need to alleviate the potential
problem of transforming a simple state tort action into one of
constitutional dimension through clever pleading. 87 The court
was satisfied that the qualification fairly restricts litigation so
that only legitimate claims will come to suit.
Another restriction on litigation is the exhaustion requirement. Exhaustion of intraservice remedies, the court observed,
allows a plaintiff to seek relief without the necessity of civillitigation. If this process proves unavailing, the reviewing court will
have the benefit of the views and fact-finding of the military aujudges do not run the army.").
81. 453 F.2d 197, 201-02. See supra text accompanying notes 29-33.
82. Wallace, 661 F.2d at 733.
83. [d. at 734.
84. [d. at 733 n.5.
85. See supra note 3.
86. 661 F.2d at 734.
87. [d. See, e.g., Everett v. United States, 492 F. Supp. 318, 322 (S.D. Ohio 1980)
(upholding Feres in a wrongful death action when claims seeking relief "directly under
the United States Constitution" are in effect actions in tort); Schmid v. Rumsfeld, 481 F.
Supp. 19, 21 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (denying relief under Feres to military informant for injuries sustained "incident to service"); Misko v. United States, 453 F. Supp. 513, 515
(D.D.C. 1978) (intramilitary indemnity cannot be avoided by pleading a cause of action
as arising directly under the fifth amendment when the allegation is already barred by
the Feres doctrine). See also Calhoun, supra note 3, at 5.
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thorities. 88 Thus, the exhaustion requirement "helps to minimize
the objections to reviewability based on judicial usurpation of
military discretion and the need for military expertise."89
Immunity

As the Ninth Circuit observed, the question of immunity
arises only after a finding that the military decision is reviewable, and only if the plaintiff seeks to recover money damages. 9o
Because of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the government,
in suits without its consent, is absolutely immune from liability.
To circumvent this obstacle, the plaintiff generally will sue the
officer as an individual, rather than as a representative of the
United States. A determination must be made by the reviewing
court of whether the suit is essentially one against the government itself and therefore barred by sovereign immunity.
The Ninth Circuit observed that Economou held federal officers exercising discretion possess only qualified immunity from
liability in Bivens-type actions. However, the Economou Court
also created an exception to the general rule of qualified immunity, recognizing the need for absolute immunity when officials
engage in "the conduct of public business." Therefore, if the official charged was performing a "special function", absolute immunity applies. 91
In determining whether a military officer's activities fall
within the "special function" exception, the court distinguished
Fe res , where absolute immunity applies to federal officials for
alleged torts incident to military service. The Wallace court
found that when the actionable conduct is a constitutional violation, Feres has no application. 92 As the court recognized, both
the aggrieved individual and society have an interest in deterring unconstitutional conduct. This deterrence, while aided by
injunctive or declaratory relief, is best effectuated by the possi88. 661 F.2d at 734. The court noted that it need not delineate which intraservice
remedies must be exhausted in all cases since "[tJhe availability and usefulness of a particular remedy will vary with the branch of the armed forces involved and with the nature of the grievance." [d. at 734 n.6.
89. [d. at 734.
90. [d.

91. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978).
92. 661 F.2d at 735.
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bility of personal liability for money damages. When this avenue
of redress is cut off by absolute immunity, neither the interests
of the aggrieved party nor society are served.
The court also observed that counterveiling policy considerations exist which favor absolute immunity. In the military context especially, the policies of separation of powers, military autonomy, the need to maintain discipline and to avoid disruptive
litigation, militate toward applying absolute immunity. However, after examining the traditional areas where absolute immunity applies, the court determined that most activities of the
military "have no precise analogue" to these traditional areas. 93
The court compared the military context to the absolute
standard long afforded judicial immunity. The adjudication
function requires insulation from personal liability so that impartiality may be preserved, and while this rationale can be easily analogized to the functions of a military judge, it is inapplicable to a commanding officer whose function it is to give orders
and duty assignments. Likewise, "judges' insulation from political influence, their use of precedent in resolving disputes, and
the availability of appellate review ... reduce the need for private damage actions."9" Again, these rationales do not apply to
most routine military decisions made during peacetime.
The court recognized that the difficulty of defending suit
and the threat to military discipline favor imposing absolute immunity. However, the court believed these possibilities should
not tip the scale in favor of absolute immunity. Moreover, imposing absolute immunity in such instances, instead of qualified
immunity, would only marginally benefit an officer. 911
Because of the conflicting policy considerations peculiar to
the military context, the court was careful to adopt an intermediate course to enable trial courts to weigh these concerns before
making a determination. The Ninth Circuit recognized that a
per se rule of absolute immunity could potentially be abused by
military officials and lead to unredressable wrongs. Conversely,
too assertive a judicial role could be disruptive to military opera93. 1d. at 736.
94.1d.
95.1d.
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tions, especially in an area where the courts lack expertise. The
Ninth Circuit chose to adopt a standard of qualified immunity
while recognizing that the "special functions" exception would
still afford absolute immunity when appropriate. 9s

D.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Wallace decision is significant for several reasons. Primarily, the decision establishes a test for judicial reviewability of
internal military decisions. Rather than a per se rule, the test
articulated by the court approaches the reviewability question
on the merits of the challenge by considering individual circumstances militating either in favor of or against review. The decision is also notable because it reflects the trend away from absolute immunity for federal officials and toward protection of the
constitutional rights of military personnel.
On the issue of reviewability, the Wallace decision sets up a
framework which allows a trial judge to balance several conflicting policy concerns. No determination can be reached without
careful consideration of all relevant factors. The restrictions on
the Wallace rule-limiting review to recognized constitutional
claims and only after exhaustion of administrative remedies-distill further the candidates for Mindes-type analysis.
The Mindes test recognizes that occasionally policy considerations exist which favor denial of review, but that such occurrences are extreme. In addition, these occurrences can be
avoided by the use of summary judgment. An absolute rule barring review "would shield from responsibility even an officer who
knowingly and in bad faith violates an individual's constitutional rights."97
As with reviewability, a per se rule of absolute liability provides too much protection for military officials and comes dangerously close to inviting unconstitutional conduct. Even the
general standard of qualified immunity in most instances shields
an officer from liability. The Economou rule does not increase
the burden on the defendant to the extent that some would argue. True, the requisite showing to invoke absolute immu96. [d.

97. [d. at 737.
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nity-acts within the scope of one's authority-is not a high
standard. But it cannot be said that the qualified immunity requirement is an extraordinarily difficult one to meet. As a result
of Economou, a defendant official can be protected in two ways:
either by an adequate showing of performing a special function,
or the standard of good faith and reasonableness.
The court also left open the question of whether other circumstances may arise which favor an exception to the general
rule of qualified immunity.98 If, for example, the grievance arises
in a combat setting, future courts are free to create such an exception. The Ninth Circuit established a case-by-case approach
which allows an examination of individual concerns. By constructing a framework for analysis rather than a per se rule, trial
courts are better equipped to reach a decision in this often delicate area of law.

Craig A. Burnett·

APPEALABILITY OF ORDERS DENYING A MOTION FOR
APPOINTED COUNSEL IN A TITLE VII SUIT

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Bradshaw v. Zoological Society of San Diego, l the Ninth
Circuit held that an order denying counsel to a plaintiff in a Title VIP action is appealable before the final resolution of the
suit.
The plaintiff filed suit under Title VII alleging employment
discrimination based on gender and marital status. 8 Title VII
provides that at the court's discretion, an indigent plaintiff may
98. [d. at 736.

• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
1. 662 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Reinhardt, J.j the other panel members were
Skopil, J., and Wallace, J., dissenting).
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1976).
3. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant had denied her application for the position of
education director at the Zoological Society's Zoo. 662 F .2d at 1303. See also Bradshaw
v. Zoological Society of San Diego, 569 F.2d 1066, 1067 (9th Cir. 1978).
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be entitled to appointment of counsel. 4 The plaintiff filed a motion for appointment of counsel and for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. The district court denied the motion for appointment of counsel, but granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. o The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order denying appointed counsel; this motion was also denied.
The plaintiff then requested that the court certify the order for
interlocutory appeal,6 but the court declined to do so. The plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1291,'
the final judgment rule.
The Ninth Circuit found it had jurisdiction to review an order denying appointed counsel to a Title VII plaintiff before a
final judgment has been entered. s In so doing, the Ninth Circuit
is in accord with the majority of circuits that have considered
the issue. 9 However, the Bradshaw opinion is the first to fully
analyze why an order denying appointed counsel to a Title VII
plaintiff should be immediately appealable. This decision significantly strengthens the position of indigent Title VII plaintiffs
who, without appointed counsel, might be forced to abandon
4. The pertinent section provides: "Upon application by the complainant and in
such circumstances as the court may deem just, the court may appoint an attorney for
such complainant and may authorize the commencement of the action without the payment of fees, costs, or security." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)(B) (1976).
5. 662 F.2d at 1302. This decision was questionable since a motion to proceed in
forma pauperis and a motion for appointment of counsel share identical determining
factors: both require a finding of indigency and a finding that the cause of action has
merit. See 662 F.2d at 1308.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) provides that a district court may cerfify an otherwise
unappealable order for appellate review.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) states in part: "The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, ...
except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
8. 662 F.2d at 1320. Although this holding is similar to that reached by several circuits when considering the appealability of an order denying appointed counsel to a
plaintiff proceeding in forma pauperis (28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1966», the fact that a Title
VII plaintiff faces predictably complex litigation concerning important legislatively mandated rights places the appealability of an order denying counsel to a Title VII plaintiff
more firmly within the Cohen doctrine. See infra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
See also 662 F.2d at 1305 n.11 for a list of § 1915 appealability cases.
9. For those circuits finding Cohen applicable, see Hudak v. Curators of the Univ. of
Mi88ouri, 586 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 985 (1979);
Caston v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1977); Spanos v. Penn. Cent.
. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1972). Each of these opinions contains only a cursory
. analysis of the appealability i88ue. See 662 F.2d at 1305 n.11. In Randle v. Victor Welding Supply Co., 664 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1981), the court denied appealability, reversing
its earlier decision in Jones v. WFYR Radio/RKO Gen., 626 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1980).
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meritorious claims.
B.

BACKGROUND

The Final Judgment Rule and the Cohen Doctrine

The purposes of the final judgment rule are to restrict the
appellate caseload, prevent judicial waste, and preserve lower
court independence. 1o The Supreme Court has also seen the rule
as a barrier to appeals brought to harass opponents. l l Paradoxically, strict adherence to the final judgment rule can cause judicial waste. Prohibiting immediate review is not economical if an
early determination of the issue prevents a reversal after final
judgment and an order for a new trial. 12 To correct this problem,
the courts and legislature have created narrow exceptions to the
final judgment rule.18
Apart from the problem of judicial waste, strict compliance
with the final judgment rule can cause the permanent loss of a
litigant's rights. The Supreme Court has therefore stated that
the rule should be given a "practical rather than a technical construction"l4 when review after final judgment would have "a
final and irreparable effect on the rights of the parties. "UI
In Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.,18 the Court set forth
guidelines for determining from which orders appeals should be
10. See Note, Appealability of Orders Denying Attorney Disqualification Motions
in Armstrong v. McAlpin, DET. C.L. REV. 151, 153-61 (1981) for a discussion of the history and development of these policies. See also Note, Appealability in the Federal
Courts, 75 HARV. L. REV. 351 (1961).
11.
Congress from the very beginning has, by forbidding piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a
single controversy, set itself against enfeebling judicial administration. Thereby it avoided the obstruction to just claims
that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a
succession of separate appeals from the various rulings to
which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of
judgment.
Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1939).
12. See, e.g., 662 F.2d at 1315.
13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1976) which lists appealable interlocutory orders and allows certification of otherwise unappealable orders.
14. Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
15. [d. at 545.
16. 337 U.S. 541 (1948). Cohen allowed the appeal of an order denying a defendant's
motion to require plaintiff to post security for costs in a shareholder's derivative suit.
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taken before a final judgment. 17 First, the order must be a final
determination by the lower court. IS This initial inquiry recognizes that the relationship between trial and appellate courts entails review, not supervision. Thus, if a lower court order is tentative, it would be improper interference for the appellate court
to consider the issue. It
The second Cohen requirement, separability,20 is also based
on the importance of lower court independence. To be appealable, the order must not share issues of law and fact in common
with the still-unresolved suit in the lower court. A prior determination of these issues by an appellate court would constitute unwarranted interference with the lower court proceedings. U
The third prong of the Cohen test is that the order cannot
be effectively reviewed after final judgment. lUI Whether effective
review is possible is measured by the type and degree of harm to
be suffered by the person seeking early review.23 Cohen emphasized that some rights are more "important" than others, and
thus should not be denied immediate review. 24 A more recent
Supreme Court case, Firestone Tire & Rubber v. Risjord,26 requires a showing of concrete, irreparable harm which could be
avoided only by immediate appeal. 2S This requirement operates
to check appeals brought to purposely delay trials or harass opponents by giving the court discretion as to the relative importance of the appeal.27
Although the relativism of the Cohen doctrine leaves room
for judicial discretion, language such as "too important to be de17. [d. at 546.
18. [d.

19. "Permitting piecemeal appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge ...." Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).
20. 337 U.S. at 546-47.
21. 449 U.S. at 374.
22. 337 U.S. at 546.
23. 449 U.S. at 376; Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 n.ll (1975).
24. 337 U.S. at 546.
25. 449 U.S. 368 (1981).
26. [d. at 376.
27. 662 F.2d 1301, 1315. "Civil rights litigants simply do not appeal an order denying them appointed counsel in order to obstruct 'just claims,' but rather do so in an
attempt to vindicate their rights." [d.
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nied review"28 makes the doctrine difficult to apply to a general
class of orders. The language of Cohen gives rise to questions of
equity more easily answered by the facts of each individual case.
In Roberts v. United States District Court,29 the Supreme Court
held that a denial of leave to proceed in forma pauperis is immediately appealable under Cohen. The Court did not further
analyze the issue. so In Firestone, the Court held that a denial of
an attorney disqualification motion is not appealable under Cohen because no irreparable harm would be caused by review
after final judgment.sl The propriety of the lower court's decision to refuse disqualification of counsel would be "difficult to
assess until its impact on the underlying litigation may be evaluated, which is normally only after final judgment. "S2
As the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Bradshaw demonstrates, a
motion for appointment of counsel under Title VII is more
closely related to a motion to proceed in forma pauperis than it
is to a request for disqualification of counseps One who is denied appointed counsel in a Title VII suit is unlikely to be able
to proceed with the complex litigation,s4 much as the plaintiff
denied permission to proceed in forma pauperis is stopped from
pursuing his or her claim. The litigant denied a motion for disqualification of counsel, however, may still participate in the
suit, even while watching for signs of prejudice. This distinction
applies as well to the question of effective review after final
judgment. The plaintiff requesting leave to proceed in forma
pauperis or to have counsel appointed may be forced to abandon the claim before final judgment if either motion is denied. SII
This would naturally preclude appeal after final judgment and
the plaintiff's claim would be lost without having had the chance
for appellate review. By contrast, the litigant denied a motion to
disqualify an attorney is usually capable of continuing the suit
and making an appeal.
In the unlikely event that a Title VII plaintiff had the
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

337 U.S. at 546.
339 U.S. 844 (1949).
The Court did not offer any reasons to support its holding. Id. at 844-45.
449 U.S. at 378.
Id. at 377.
662 F.2d at 1308-10.
Id. at 1310.
Id. at 1312.
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means to litigate the claim through final judgment and appeal, it
is doubtful that the harm suffered in the first trial could be remedied by a new trial with appointed counsel. 88 If the uncounseled
plaintiff is considered to have had the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, for example, the testimony given at the first
trial may be admitted as evidence in the new trial and the plaintiff would be bound by any errors made in obtaining that testimony.87 As the Bradshaw court points out, an un counseled litigant would probably be unaware of making prejudicial errors
and would be unable to prove that errors had been made. 88
Some of the issues raised by delays of criminal trials are
also applicable to the instant question. The Ninth Circuit estimated that if appeal of the appointment of counsel question
were delayed until after the final judgment and the appeal resulted in a new trial, the claim brought by the plaintiff might
not be resolved until seventeen years after it arose. 89 When years
of delay are involved, evidence can be lost, memories may dim,
witnesses may be influenced and the entire cultural context of
the suit may have changed. 40
The Nature of Title VII Rights

The resolution of the question presented in Bradshaw
turned upon the nature of the rights created by Title VII since
Cohen and its progeny require that immediate appeal be allowed
only for "important" rights that would be irreparably lost if appeal were delayed. 41
Title VII was enacted to create a legal remedy for victims of
discrimination in employment. Congress recognized that administrative agencies alone could not remedy employment discrimination: "[T]he private right of action ... provides the aggrieved
party a means by which he may be able to escape from the ad36. Id. at 1312-14.
37. 4 H. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 804-19 (1981).
38. 662 F.2d at 1313-14.
39. Id. at 1314 n.25.
40. See generally Brief for Appellant, United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850
(1978). This last factor may have an especially significant effect on the outcome of a civil
rights suit, since, for example, a jury may have viewed racial discrimination as a more
important problem in 1968 when the issue received much public attention, than it would
have a decade later when such attention diminished.
41. 662 F.2d at 1306.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol13/iss1/12

22

Burnett et al.: Federal Practice & Procedure

FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

1983]

271

ministrative quagmire .... ""2 However, the drafters feared
that since a Title VII plaintiff would most likely belong to a disadvantaged class, "the maintenance of a suit may impose a great
burden on a poor individual complainant.""s Therefore, provision was made for counsel to be appointed at the discretion of
the district court."" Since Title VII does not provide guidelines
for appointment of counsel,411 the courts have conditioned appointment upon a finding that the plaintiff is indigent, has made
reasonable efforts to retain counsel, and is presenting a meritorious claim. "8
C.

THE

Bradshaw

DECISION

The Majority

In Bradshaw, the Ninth Circuit held that an order denying
appointed counsel to a Title VII plaintiff meets the criteria for
appealability under Cohen. 47 To be appealable, "the order must
conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action and
be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.""s
The majority found that the order denying appointed counsel was a final decision of the district court. "8 The first prong of
the Cohen test was satisfied as the district court judge had denied a motion to reconsider the order and there was no indication in the record that the order was tentative. 60
The Ninth Circuit found that the issue of appointment of
42. 110 CONGo REC. 12,721 (1964), reprinted in E.E.O.C. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
TITLES VII AND XI OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, 3004 (1968).
43. [d.
44. 42 U.S.C. 2000e·5(0(1)(B) (1976). See supra note 4.
45. There is some indication that the section containing the provision for appointed
counsel was hastily included in Title VII. See 118 CONGo REC. 954 (1972) which describes
the removal from the bill of a cease and desist authority. The provision for appointed
counsel was inadvertently weakened by the removal and was quickly amended by a voice
vote. This may explain why the drafters did not foresee certain problems in the statute's
application. If, for example, a Title VII plaintiff loses the suit, appointed counsel may
receive no compensation. As pointed out by the Bradshaw dissent, the drafters could
have also made a provision for appealability. 662 F.2d at 1322.
46. See, e.g., Caston V. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 556 F.2d at 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1977).
47. 662 F.2d at 1306.
48. Coopers & Lybrand V. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
49. 662 F.2d at 1306.
50.Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 12

272

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:265

counsel is separate from the merits of the Title VII suit, thus
satisfying the second Cohen requirement. III Since the purpose of
the separability requirement is to protect the independent determinations of the lower court, the Ninth Circuit looked at the
extent to which appellate courts would become "enmeshed" in
issues of law and fact as yet undetermined by the lower court. liS
The test used by the courts to determine if counsel should
be appointed is the same as that used to consider a motion to
proceed in forma pauperis: a finding of plaintiff's indigency and
a finding that the underlying claim has merit. 1I3 The Supreme
Court has held that the denial of a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis is appealable before final judgment under Cohen. II..
Since the determination is the same for both motions, the Ninth
Circuit found that the separability requirement was met in
Bradshaw. 1I1I This finding was further supported by an earlier
Ninth Circuit decision holding that an order denying appointment of counsel to revervation Indians was appealable under
Cohen. lie
The third requirement of the Cohen doctrine is that review
51. Id. at 1310.
52. Id. at 1307.
53. Id. at 1308.
54. Roberts v. United States District Court, supra note 29.
55. 662 F.2d at 1308. The court also suggested that the determination of merit could
be made from a favorable Equal Employment Opportunity Commission "reasonable
cause" finding. Before filing suit under Title VII, the plaintiff must submit the facts
surrounding the alleged discrimination to the EEOC. If the EEOC finds reasonable cause
to believe the complaint has merit, the plaintiff is so notified. The procedure is designed
to assure federal jurisdiction for the suit. Id. at 1309.
The court then suggested that a favorable EEOC determination may be used by an
appeals court when deciding an appointment of counsel issue. An unfavorable EEOC
statement, on the other hand, should not be used because if erroneous, the plaintiff's
rights may be abridged. Use of the EEOC determination is not necessary since the court
may use the same limited investigation required for a motion to proceed in forma
pauperis when determining appointment of counsel. Id. at n.20. See also Caston, supra
note 9, at 1309~
56. Id. at 1310, citing Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. Escondido Mutual Water
Co., 459 F.2d 1082 (9th Cir. 1972). See also Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266 (9th
Cir. 1981). In Ivey, the Ninth Circuit considered the appeal of an order denying appointed counsel to a Title VII plaintiff. In determining that the plaintiff's Title VII claim
was not meritorious, the court looked at the plaintiff's criminal record. The plaintiff had
been convicted of twenty-six felony counts for acts done in the course of his employment; the Ninth Circuit held that the suit based on racial discrimination in firing the
plaintiff lacked merit. The order denying appointed counsel was affirmed. Id. at 269.
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of the order after final judgment would be ineffective. 67 The
Bradshaw court distinguished between the effectiveness of a new
trial as the remedy for erroneous denial ofa motion to appoint
counsel and the remedy for an order denying disqualification of
counseP8 In Firestone, the Supreme Court had found that upon
reversal of a denial of disqualification of counsel, a new trial
would sufficiently remedy the harm suffered by the appellant in
the' first trial. II9 The Ninth Circuit distinguished Firestone on
two grounds: the likelihood of resulting injury and the homogeneous nature of Title VII appointment of counsel claims. 80
The Supreme Court denied interlocutory appeal in Firestone because the appellant had not shown a "single concrete
example" of prejudice which would result from appeal after final
judgment. 8J Because an order denying disqualification of counsel
does not always cause harm to the appellant, specific examples
of harm must be shown.82 The Bradshaw court pointed out that
the likelihood of injury to one denied appointed counsel was
great and that prejudice was inherent in proceeding to trial
without counsel. 88
The second reason appealability was not found in Firestone
was that the question of disqualification of counsel arises in diverse legal contexts; since the amount and degree of harm can
not be predicted for this type of order, allowing early appeal
would be less efficient than waiting until final judgment to assess
the harm done. 84 The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the same is
not true of orders denying appointed counsel to a Title VII
plaintiff. Since Title VII litigation is so complex, an uncounseled
plaintiff with a meritorious suit would predictably lose the right
to proceed with the claim or be bound by prejudicial errors
made at the first trial. 86 Therefore, it is not necessary for the
Title VII plaintiff to show that actual harm was suffered in order to appeal an order denying appointed counsel; the Cohen
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

662 F.2d at 1310.
[d. at 1312-13.
449 U.S. 368, 378 (1981).
662 F.2d at 1312-13.
449 U.S. at 376.

62. [d.

63. 662 F.2d at 1312.
64. 449 U.S. at 377-78.
65. 662 F.2d at 1313.
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requirement is satisfied by a presumption of irreparable harm.66
The Bradshaw court found its holding to be supported by
the policies underlying both the final judgment rule and Title
VII. Allowing the early appeal of an order denying appointed
counsel to a Title VII plaintiff would not result in interference
with the lower court's determinations if the order was final. 67 It
is unlikely that a plaintiff would seek to delay trial by making
the appeal, since without counsel the suit may never be resolved.
Judicial waste would actually be avoided by allowing the appeal,
since reversible error could be avoided during the first trial, or a
plaintiff who was properly denied counsel may be encouraged to
abandon the suit at an early stage. 66 The court found it unlikely
that an appropriate refusal of appointed counsel would result in
the case following "the normal course to trial. "69
The Ninth Circuit found that allowing early appeal of the
order was also supported by the congressional intent underlying
Title VII.70 Since the provision for appointed counsel was characterized by Congress as an "important" right, the presumption
that a Title VII plaintiff could not effectively litigate a claim
without counsel was warranted.71
The Dissent

The dissent based its opinion on the view that the Cohen
doctrine is extremely narrow and should not be invoked for the
sole reason of avoiding injustice.7lI Rejecting the presumption
reached by the majority that uncounseled Title VII litigation is
ineffective, the dissent concluded that Congress must have anticipated some plaintiffs proceeding in propria persona. Con66. Id. at 1313-14.
67. Id. at 1314.
68. Id. at 1315-16.
69. Id. at 1316.
70. Id. at 1316-17.
71. Id. at 1317. The Bradshaw court, finding that it had jurisdiction of the appeal
under Cohen, then turned to the merits of the appeal. The appellate court found that
the lower court order granting the plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis was
sufficient to support a finding of indigency. The second requirement, that the plaintiff
use reasonable efforts to obtain counsel, was satisfied by affidavits filed with the court.
To satisfy the requirement of meritoriousness, the Ninth Circuit used the favorable
EEOC determination obtained by the plaintiff prior to the suit. The order denying appointed counsel was reversed and the case remanded to district court. Id. at 1319-20.
72. Id. at 1320-21.
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gress could have provided for interlocutory appeal within Title
VII, but did not. 73
Although agreeing that the finality requirement of Cohen
was satisfied in Bradshaw, the dissent argued that an order denying appointed counsel could not be considered apart from the
Title VII cause of action. 7• The determination necessary for appointment of counsel requires a deeper investigation into the
facts comprising the plaintiff's cause of action than would a decision concerning leave to proceed in forma pauperis since counsel should not be appointed to a losing case. 711 Since Title VII
does not provide for an attorney's compensation in the event the
case is lost, the dissent reasoned that the hardship to counsel
must be balanced against the benefit to the plaintiff. This would
entail more than a finding that the suit was "non-frivolous."76
The dissent found that an order denying appointed counsel
could be effectively reviewed after final judgment." Two lines of
cases illustrate the difference between a right that would be destroyed without immediate appeal and an erroneous order which
would merely "taint" the first trial'8 The dissent concluded that
an erroneous order denying appointed counsel would only taint
the proceedings as does the non-appealable denial of a motion to
disqualify an attorney.79 Denial of appointed counsel does not
destroy a right as would wrongful denial of bail to a criminal
defendant. 80
The Bradshaw plaintiff would not suffer loss of rights, the
73. Id. at 1321.
74. Id. at 1321-22.
75. Id. at 1322.
76. Id. The dissent also disagreed with the majority's suggestion that an EEOC reasonable cause determination could be used to decide if the plaintiff's case had merit. The
dissent believed that an EEOC statement can only be used for jurisdictional purposes.
The dissent also objected to the disparate treatment given favorable and unfavorable
EEOC findings. Id. at 1322-23. The basis for this objection is unclear since only the
plaintiff's rights would be at stake and no one else would be affected by the use of only
favorable findings.
77. Id. at 1323.
78. Id. at 1323-24. Compare Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (rights in danger of
harm because bail was denied), with Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S.
368 (1981) (rights are not endangered by an appeal after final judgment of an order
denying disqualification of counsel).
79. 662 F.2d at 1324.
SO.Id.
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dissent explained, since she could continue with her suit, ob- .
taining a new trial after final judgment if the denial of counsel
was erroneous.81 An order denying appointed counsel is distinguishable on this point from an order denying leave to proceed
in forma pauperis since denial of the latter prevents the plaintiff from proceeding at all. ~he dissent saw no "inherent
prejudice" in prosecuting a Title VII claim without benefit of
counsel since the plaintiff is as likely to win the suit as she
would be likely to commit prejudicial tactical errors.82 Since the
outcome of the suit is speculative, the Cohen doctrine should be
inapplicable. Some concrete irreparable harm must be shown
before an early appeal should be allowed. The dissent also recommended use of a writ of mandamus as an appropriate avenue
for relief. 88
Last, the dissent argued that allowing interlocutory appeal
of orders denying appointed counsel would not serve the goal of
judicial economy.84 The final judgment rule requires that all appeals from a suit be heard at once so that only one retrial may
be necessary. Interlocutory appeals result in delay of the proceedings in the lower courts. 811 Since the losing side always has
an interest in appealing orders, allowing interlocutory appeal
only serves the interests of that side. The dissent feared that the
ability to delay trial with early appeals would result in forcing
the settlement of strike suits. 88
D.

SIGNIFICANCE

While the Bradshaw decision is in accord with the majority
of circuits that have considered the issue,8? it is the first to consider the issue after Firestone. It is also the first to have thoroughly analyzed the appealability of an order denying appointed
counsel to a Title VII plaintiff.
81. Id.
82.ld.
83. Id. But see Roberts, supra note 29, which rejected the use of mandamus to appeal a denial to proceed in forma pauperis.
84. 662 F.2d at 1325.
85.ld.
86. Id. at 1320. Since the dissent found that the Ninth Circuit should not have jurisdiction to hear the Bradshaw appeal, the opinion did not contain discussion of the merits of that appeal.
87. See supra note 9.
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Three basic questions divided the Bradshaw court. First,
the dissent disagreed that an appellate court could decide the
appointment of counsel issue without interfering with the lower
court's independent findings of law and fact.88 Since the case law
requires only that the court find that the plaintiff's case has
merit and does not define merit in terms of who will win or lose
the suit, the dissent's objection is unfounded. It is unfortunate
that Title VII contains no provision for compensation of appointed counsel when the plaintiff loses the case, but this is an
issue beyond the scope of appealability. The actual basis for the
disagreement between the majority and the dissent in Bradshaw
is the question of whether an uncounseled plaintiff can effectively litigate a Title VII suit. If refusal to appoint an attorney
effectively prevents continuance of the suit, a judge considering
the probable outcome of the suit as a basis for appointing counselis actually determining the plaintiff's right to sue. Congress
provided the victim of employment discrimination with the right
to sue; this is not a matter for the court's discretion.
Without statistical data, it may be impossible to determine
if an uncounseled plaintiff can effectively litigate a Title VII
suit. The dissent pointed out that the plaintiff in Bradshqw had
thus far been able to pursue her claim in court,8S but the dissent
neglected to note that the plaintiff had been receiving assistance
from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission in her effort to receive appointed counsel. eo The EEOC does not have
sufficient resources to assist every needy Title VII plaintiff.sl Title VII is a complex piece of legislation and the litigation arising
from it is much more complicated than the type of suit a layperson can successfully pursue without counsel. The majority's presumption that an uncounseled plaintiff may be forced to abandon a Title VII cause of action is a reasonable one. The courts,
therefore, should look to the merit of the plaintiff's claim to determine if counsel should be appointed since basing a decision
on the eventual outcome of the suit could result in an unjust
88. 662 F.2d at 1321-22.
89. Id. at 1322 n.4.
90. Id. at 1311 n.24.
91. The EEOC's burdensome caseload has led to "lengthy delays in the administrative process and has frequently frustrated the remedial role of the agency." H.R. REP.
No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d SeBS. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
2137, 2147.
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deprivation of the plaintiff's right to sue.
The second point of contention within the Bradshaw court
concerned the availability of effective review after final judg.,
ment. Once again, the basis of the disagreement is the plaintiff's
ability to successfully litigate a Title VII claim without benefit
of counsel. The majority held that an un counseled plaintiff
would suffer irreparable harm if forced to proceed through the
first trial without opportunity to appeal the denial of appointment of counsel,92 There are several types of errors to which the
plaintiff would be bound in the event of a new trial. The dissent
refused to assume that an uncounseled plaintiff would make
prejudicial errors and would require a showing of actual harm
before allowing an appeal,93 The problem with this position is
that the only wayan uncounseled plaintiff could show that prejudicial errors had been committed would be to proceed through
the lower court trial. However, by the time actual errors could
be shown, the irreparable harm that the Cohen doctrine is
designed to prevent would already have occurred. The plaintiff
should not be put in such an anomalous position. If the presumption that an uncounseled plaintiff cannot effectively pursue
a Title VII suit is reasonable, then an early appeal of the appointment of counsel issue is the only means to prevent irreparable harm to the plaintiff.
The third area of divergence between the Bradshaw majority and dissent was over the effect of the court's holding on judicial economy. The dissent feared that an exception to the final
judgment rule would create uneconomical delays in the lower
courts and increase the number of appeals. B• The majority
stated that an early appeal of the appointment of counsel issue
would prevent the need for reversal and grant of a new trial. B6
Again, this disagreement is based upon the uncounseled plaintiff's ability to pursue effective Title VII litigation. If an uncounseled plaintiff is unable to pursue a Title VII claim, it is likely
that refusal to appoint counsel will be reversible error. If reversible error is more likely than not, then judicial economy is better
served by an early appeal and avoidance of retrial. This question
92. 662 F.2d at 1312.
93. Id. at 1324.
94. Id. at 1325.
95. Id. at 1315-16.
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should be resolved on the side of allowing interlocutory appeal,
since the courts' duty to protect legislatively created rights must
outweigh concern for burgeoning caseloads. 96
Although the Ninth Circuit has expressed a reluctance to
enlarge the class of appealable orders,9? the Bradshaw opinion
shows that the court recognizes a need to provide effective review of orders wholly dependent on the trial judge's discretion.
Since the appointment of counsel depends upon the court's discretion, it would be unlikely that a lower court judge would recognize the possibility of abuse of that discretion by certifying
the order as appealable. In addition, appellate courts should give
particular attention to those rights dependent wholly on judicial
discretion to insure that effective review of decisions affecting
those rights is available.
By expressly recognizing that an uncounseled Title VII
plaintiff cannot effectively litigate a civil rights suit,98 the Ninth
Circuit has helped to secure the only remedy afforded by Title
VII. It is to be hoped that the district courts will be less hesitant
to appoint counsel for an indigent plaintiff presenting a meritorious Title VII claim.

Susan Shors·

96. See Cohen, 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1948). See also Note, Appealability of Orders
Denying Attorney Disqualification Motions in Armstrong v. McAlpin, DET. C.L. REv.
151, 165 (1981), discussing the harm done to the entire judicial system when litigants'
rights are subordinated to the desire to "maintain moderate work loads."

97. See Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1964) in which the court stated
that the certified appeal allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976) removed any incentive to
enlarge the class of appealable orders.
98. 662 F.2d at 1312, 1314.
• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
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DIVERGENT APPLICATION OF COHEN DOCTRINE TO
GRANT OF MOTIONS DISQUALIFYING COUNSEL IN
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL CASES

A.

INTRODUCTION

In United States u. Greger/ the Ninth Circuit held that a
district court order disqualifying a criminal defendant's counsel
is not appealable prior to a final judgment under 28 U.S.C. section 1291.1 The district court had disqualified the defendant's
counsel from further representation in the case because of a conflict of interest. 8 The defendant sought an immediate appeal of
the ruling or, alternatively, that the court treat the request for
review as a petition for a writ of mandamus. The court refused
to issue the writ because the applicable guidelines were not
met.·
In the case In Re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings (Petroleum Products),r' the Ninth Circuit held that an order disqualifying counsel in a civil case is immediately appealable under section 1291. Petroleum Products was a consolidated multi-district
antitrust case in which defense counsel was disqualified from
representing defendant's former and present employees in connection with discovery dispositions. By allowing both the defendants and the deponents to appeal the decision, the court extended the right to an immediate appeal to any party involved
in a civil suit whose counsel has been disqualified.
1. 657 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Duniway, J.; the other panel members were
Norris, J. and Hanson D.J., sitting by designation), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W.
3607 (U.S. Jan. 19, 1982)(No. 81-1357).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976) provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States, ... except
where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court."
3. Defendant's counsel and his firm had represented witnesses before the grand jury
in connection with the same investigation which led to defendant's indictment, 657 F.2d
at 1114.
4. A writ of mandamus is provided for by Title 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976), which
states: "The Supreme Court and all courts established by an act of Congress may iBBue
all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to
the usages and principles of law." The Supreme Court in Kerr v. United States, 426 U.S.
394 (1976) explained that the remedy of a writ of mandamus is a drastic one and should
be employed only in extraordinary circumstances.
5. 658 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Goodwin, J.; the other penal members were
Nelson, J. and Price, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1615 (1982).
The Ninth Circuit, in Gough v. Perkowski, 694 F.2d 1140 (9th Cir. 1982), affirmed its
decision in Petroleum Products.
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The appellants in both cases sought appellate jurisdiction
under Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp. 6 As a result of the two
Ninth Circuit decisions, Cohen is applicable to attorney disqual~
ifications in civil suits but not in criminal prosecutions. This
casenote will analyze this distinction and explore appellate juris~
diction under Cohen in the two different legal contexts. 7
B.

BACKGROUND

The Cohen Doctrine

Appellate jurisdiction in the federal courts is based on Title
28 U.S.C. section 1291. 8 This statute codified the common law
"final judgment rule" which mandates that appellate review of
lower court rulings await the termination of the litigation in the
trial court. 9
In the landmark case of Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp.,10
the Supreme Court acknowledged that there are some interlocu~
tory decisions which Congress intended to be appealable within
the meaning of section 1291. The Court defined these decisions
as a "small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause
6. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The issue presented in Cohen was whether defendants in a
stockholders derivative action had the right to require that plaintiffs post security for
costs.
7. The Ninth Circuit has become increasingly sensitive to the proliferation of interlocutory appeals. In Greger the jurisdictional issue was argued only after the court solicited supplemental briefs on the issue. In a previous case which dealt with the same issue
as that presented by Petroleum Products, the court overlooked the jurisdictional issue.
Gas·A-Tron of Arizona v. Union Oil Co. of California, 534 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
8. See supra note 2.
9. In Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1935), the Court explained the reasons for the final judgment rule in these terms:
Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of
federal appellate procedure. It was written into the first judiciary act and has been departed from only when observance of
it would practically defeat the right to any review at all. Since
the right to a judgment from more than one court is a matter
of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice, Congress
from the very beginning has, by forbidding piecemeal disposi.
tion on appeal of what for practical purposes is a single controversy, set itself against enfeebling judicial administration.
Id. at 324.
10. 337 U.S. at 541.
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itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until
the whole case is adjudicated."l1 The Court also emphasized
that the statute should be given a "practical rather than a technical construction."12
Cohen's Application in the Criminal Context
The first application of the Cohen doctrine by the Supreme
Court in the criminal context was in Stack v. Boyle,ls where the
Court found that the denial of a defendant's motion to reduce
bail can be immediately appealed. More recently, in Abney v.
United States,14 the Supreme Court held that a motion to dismiss an indictment on the ground that it violates the prohibition
against double jeopardy is also immediately appealable under
Cohen. In finding the Cohen rationale applicable, the Abney
Court reasoned that the constitutional protection against double
jeopardy would be irretrievably lost if the defendant must undergo a trial for the same offense twice before litigating his claim
on appeal. 1& Despite its holding, the Court nevertheless emphasized that the Cohen doctrine would have less applicability in
criminal prosecutions than in civil suits. Ie
Cases subsequent to Abney demonstrate the limited extent
to which the Supreme Court is willing to extend the Cohen doctrine in criminal cases. In United States v. MacDonald/'1 the
Court held that a denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on
the ground that a defendant's right to a speedy trial has been
violated is not an appealable order under Cohen. In distinguishing the speedy trial claim from the double jeopardy claim in Abney, the Court insisted that the right to a speedy trial is not a
"right not to be tried" but rather a right to be free from convic11. rd.
12. rd.

at 546.

13. 342 U.S. 1 (1951). Writing separately in Stack, Justice Jackson, the author of
Cohen, explained that "an order fixing bail can be reviewed without halting the main
trial-its issues are entirely independent of the issues to be tried-and unless it can be
reviewed before sentence, it can never be reviewed at all." rd. at 12.
14. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
15. rd. at 661.
16. "Adherence to this rule of finality has been particularly stringent in criminal
prosecutions because 'the delays and disruptions attendant upon intermediate appeal,'
which the rule is designed to avoid 'are specially inimical to the effective and fair administration of the criminal law.' .. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 657, quoting Dibella
v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124 (1962).
17. 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
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tion if the right is violated. 18 The defendant can seek a dismissal
of the conviction on appeal if he proves his speedy trial claim.
Interlocutory review under Cohen is therefore unnecessary to
safeguard the right.
In United States v. Layton, the Ninth Circuit examined the
application of the Cohen doctrine in criminal cases, reasoning
that "a challenge to the 'very authority of the prosecution to hail
the defendant into the court in the first place' has been the basis
of each of the claims in the criminal context which have been
held by the Supreme Court or this court to be immediately appealable under Cohen. "19 Thus, the Layton court held that the
denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable before a final judgment. 2o In United
States v. Garner,21 the Ninth Circuit found that an order denying a motion to dismiss based on grand jury irregularities is also
not an immediately appealable order. Just as MacDonald rejected the claim that the right to a speedy trial would be irreparably lost if reviewed only after conviction, the Ninth Circuit
found that the right to a grand jury indictment before trial
would not be defeated if claims of grand jury irregularities were
not subject to immediate review. 22
The Ninth Circuit, however, has been willing to extend its
reasoning in Layton beyond the limits set forth by the Supreme
Court. In United States v. Wilson,23 denials of motions to dismiss on the ground of selective prosecution were held to be immediately appealable. Likewise in United States v. Yellow
Freight System,24 the court found that a refusal to dismiss prosecution for lack of an indictment is appealable under the Cohen
18. [d. at 861. One of the underlying reasons of the speedy trial clause is the prevention of prejudice to the defense due to the passage of time. The Court reasoned that an
assessment of possible prejudice could not be made until the evidence was presented at
trial. Thus. the Court concluded the order was not totally collateral to the merits.
preventing the application of Cohen. [d. at 859.
19. 645 F.2d 681. 683 (9th Cir. 1981). quoting United States v. Griffin. 617 F.2d
1342. 1346 (9th Cir.). cert. denied. 449 U.S. 863 (1980).
20. 645 F.2d at 684.
21. 632 F.2d 758. 766 (9th Cir. 1980).
22. [d. at 765.
23. 639 F.2d 500 (9th Cir. 1981). For an analysis of the Wilson case. see Note. Selective Prosecution of Tax Protestors: Did the Ninth Circuit Go Too Far. 12 GOLDEN GATE
UNIV. L. REV. 325 (1981).
24. 637 F.2d 1248. 1251 (9th Cir.). cert. denied. 454 U.S. 815 (1981).
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doctrine.
In its most recent opinion dealing with this issue in a criminal context, United States v. Hollywood Motor Car CO.,SI the
Supreme Court held Cohen inapplicable to a denial of a motion
to dismiss an indictment due to vindictive prosecution. Relying
on MacDonald, the Court reasoned that the right to be free
from vindictive prosecution could be safeguarded on appeal by a
dismissal of the convictions on the disputed charges. S8
Cohen in the Civil Context
The scope of Cohen's applicability in the civil context has
not been as clearly defined as it has been in the criminal context. In criminal cases the applicability of Cohen is dependent
upon whether the order implicates a right which would be lost
irretrievably if appeal was deferred until after conviction and
sentencing. This right is not at issue in a civil suit. Thus the
Supreme Court, in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,n advocated a practical approach to the question of finality in civil
cases. The Court stated:
Our cases long have recognized that whether a
ruling is 'final' within the meaning of § 1291 is
frequently so close a question that decision of
that issue either way can be supported with
equally forceful arguments, and that it is impossible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal
cases coming within what might well be called the
'twilight zone' of finality. IS

As a result of this difficulty, the Court has urged that the requirement of finality be given a "practical rather than a technical construction."se In giving it a practical construction, the
Court has urged a balancing between "the inconvenience and
25. 102 S. Ct. 3081 (1982).
26. Id. at 3085. Hollywood overturned the Ninth Circuit decision in United States v.
Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863 (1980). The Griffin court
reasoned that a claim of vindictive prosecution raised a right to be free from the prosecution itself, and thus would be lost irreparably if Cohen did not apply. Id. at 1345.
27. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
28. Id. at 152. In Gillespie, the petitioner sued for damages under various theories
on behalf of several beneficiaries. The district court struck portions of the complaint
relating to one of the plaintiff's theories of liability as well as parts relating to recovery
for persons other than the plaintiff. Id. at 156.
29. 337 U.S. 541, 546. See supra note 12.
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costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of
denying justice by delay on the other."30
This kind of balancing was demonstrated in Norman v. McKee,31 where the Ninth Circuit held that Cohen was applicable
to a district court's disapproval of a class action settlement
under Rule 23(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 32 The
court reasoned that because of the inherent length and complexity of class action suits, the inconvenience of piecemeal review of
an order disapproving a settlement is outweighed by the danger
of denying justice to each member of the represented class. 33
In an effort to clarify the scope of the Cohen doctrine, the
Supreme Court, in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,3. listed three
requirements an order must meet to be immediately appealable
under Cohen. The order must: (1) conclusively determine the
disputed question; (2) resolve an important issue completely
separable from the merits of the action; and, (3) be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 311
In Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord,38 the Court's
most recent decision dealing with Cohen in a civil context, an
30. 379 U.S. at 152-53, quoting Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S.
507, 511 (1950). The Gillespie Court reasoned that in this case any delay in reviewing
the rights of persons referred to by the stricken portions of the complaint would be so
unjust as to outweigh the inconvenience and cost of piecemeal review. 379 U.S. at 153.
31. 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970).
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) states: "A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs."
33. 431 F.2d at 474.
34. 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
35. The Court ruled that the Cohen doctrine does not apply to a prejudgment order
denying class certification because such an order is subject to revision in the district
court under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(I); involves considerations that are "enmeshed in the
factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action," (quoting Mercantile
National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963»; and is subject to effective review
after final judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs or intervening class members.
See also United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977).
36. 449 U.S. 368 (1981). In Firestone, defendant liability insurer moved to disqualify
lead counsel for the plaintiff because of an alleged conflict of interest arising from the
fact that defendant was also an occasional client of the lead counsel's law firm. Defendant argued that this association between plaintiff's lead counsel and defendant's insurer
would give him an incentive to structure plaintiff's claims for relief so as to enable the
insured to avoid liability, thus increasing defendant's own potential liability. Id.at 37071.
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order denying a motion to disqualify opposing party's counsel
was adjudged not immediately appealable. The Court relied on
the three-prong test established in Coopers and reasoned that
the third-prong-requiring the order to be effectively unreviewable on appeal-was not satisfied. S7 The possibility of a new trial
is wholly adequate to remedy an erroneous refusal to disqualify
counsel,88 However, the Court expressly left open the question of
whether its reasoning would extend to orders granting disqualification of counsel. S9
United States v. Greger is the first circuit decision to address the issue of appealability of a grant of counsel disqualification in a criminal case. Those cases which have addressed this
issue .in a civil context have found the Cohen doctrine to be
applicable.

In Armstrong v. McAlpin,·o the Second Circuit upheld appealability, reasoning that a disqualification order is effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment because gaining
reversal of the lower court's judgment would subject the party to
the difficult if not insurmountable task of proving the case was
lost because he was improperly forced to change counsel. U The
District of Columbia Circuit in Community Broadcasting of
Boston, Inc. v. FCC reached the same result by comparing the
difference between orders granting disqualification and those denying disqualification to orders granting and orders denying
summary judgment.411 "[W]hile the affirmative grant of the requested relief is final and appealable, a mere refusal to act is
necessarily less conclusive and ought not to be reviewed by this
court."·s
37. Id. at 376.
3S. Id. at 37S. The Court reasoned that the potential harm that might be caused by
an erroneous denial of a disqualification motion would not differ significantly from the
harm caused by erroneous denials of other nonappealable interlocutory orders such as
those denyirig discovery or for recusal of the trial judge. Id.
39. Id. at 372 n.S.
40. 625 F.2d 433 (2d Cir. 1980).
41. Id. at 440-41.
42. 546 F.2d 1022, 1025, 1025 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
43. Id. at 1025 n.13, quoting Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515, 517 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959), rev'd per curiam, Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d SOO (2d Cir. 1974).
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DECISION

In holding Cohen inapplicable to motions denying disqualification of defense counsel," the Greger panel was significantly
influenced by the Supreme Court's opinion in Firestone. Adopting the reasoning of Firestone, the court did not distinguish between the civil context presented in Firestone and the criminal
context in Greger. Rather, the court noted that historically the
Cohen doctrine has been applied more sparingly in the criminal
context.· 11
In addition, the Greger panel reasoned that the difference
between a denial of a motion to disqualify counsel and a grant of
such a motion is not of decisive significance. The court asserted
that the disruption of the litigation from an order disqualifying
counsel-which creates a sense of finality in a civil case-is absent in a criminal case where the court can appoint substitute
counseL·' Furthermore, like the order refusing to disqualify
counsel, an order granting such a motion in a criminal case is
effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment because
on appeal, prejudicial error is presumed if the order is shown to
have been erroneous.· 7 A new trial would then be ordered,
thereby vindicating the defendant's right to counsel. The court
contrasted this remedy with the right against double jeopardy
which would be irretrievably lost if not vindicated before trial.·8
In acknowledging that the remedy subjects the defendant to
a second trial, the court pointed out that the individual injustice
of enduring a second trial is outweighed by the considerations
44. The court specifically noted that it was not considering whether orders disqualifying government counsel are appealable. However, the court pointed out that "Ii]n such
a case, were the defendant to be found innocent, the government, because of the rule
against double jeopardy, would not be able to seek re-trial on the basis that the disqualification order was erroneous." Greger, 657 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.l.
45. 657 F.2d at 1112.
46. [d. at 1113. The court reasoned that the very fact that Greger was a criminal
case made it analogous to Firestone even though Greger involved a grant of a disqualification motion and Firestone a denial. The effect of a disqualification order in a criminal
case, the court reasoned, is minimized by the appointment of substitute counsel thus
likening it to the effect of a denial of a disqualification motion in a civil case. [d.
47. [d. See Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 723 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50
U.S.L.W. 3783 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1982) (No. 81-1095). But see United States v. Curcio, 694
F.2d 14, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1982); Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325, 1332 (9th Cir. 1978)
(en bane), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979).
48. 657 F.2d at 1113.
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underlying the final judgment rule. If appealability were recognized on this basis, "a whole host of orders made in the course of
a criminal trial would be immediately appealable."49
In declining to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to reinstate the disqualified attorney, the Greger
court noted that as in orders denying motions to disqualify
counsel, "the most prudent course is to find such orders unappealable but to retain discretion to permit exceptional cases to
be heard before final judgment by means of a petition for writ of
mandamus."lIo In deciding whether such a writ should issue, the
court examined the guidelines set forth by the Ninth Circuit in
Bauman v. United States,lI! and held that they had not been
met by the defendant. III
D.

THE

Petroleum Products

DECISION

In Petroleum Products, the Ninth Circuit found the three
elements comprising a "collateral order" under Firestone to be
present. IS The court noted that the first element-requiring the
order to be conclusive as to the disputed question-is stronger
in the case of a grant of disqualification than in a denial." Unlike a denial, an order granting disqualification is not subject to
reconsideration.
Second, the order was a decision on a legal issue that was
completely separate from the merits of the antitrust issues being
litigated in the case. 1111 The order was based on certain canons of
ethics regarding when an attorney must be disqualified. lIs No an49.ld.
50. ld. at 1114.
51. 557 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1977). The five guidelines outlined in Bauman are: (1) the
party seeking the writ has no other adequate means of relief, such as direct appeal; (2)
the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal; (3) the
district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) the district court's order
is an oft-repeated error or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules; and (5)
the district court's order raises new and important problems or issues of first impression.
In cases where some guidelines suggest one conclusion and other guidelines suggest another, the court should balance the competing considerations. ld. at 654-55.
52. 657 F.2d at 1115.
53. See supra text accompanying note 35. A "collateral order" is synonymous with
an interlocutory order under the Cohen doctrine.
54. 658 F.2d 1355, 1357 (9th Cir. 1981).
55.ld.
56. Canon 9 of the A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility empowers the district
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titrust issues were implicated in the decision.
Finally the court found that the order was effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Within this context
the court found that without immediate review, a party would
suffer a loss of rights which a new trial could not adequately
remedy. To illustrate this point, the court contrasted Greger,
noting that the presumption of prejudice from an erroneous disqualification order in a criminal case does not exist in a civil
case. An appellant in a civil case would thus have the difficult
burden of showing that the case was lost because of the forced
change of counsel in the course of the litigation. 1I7 In addition,
the court noted that in a civil case, the imposition on the rights
of the aggrieved party by the disruption of the litigation would
not be cured as in a criminal case by the appointment of substitute counsel. Finally, the court noted that the special policies
which dictate the need for speed and uninterrupted prosecutions
in a criminal case do not carry as much force in a civil suit. lIB
E.

ANALYSIS

Greger is the first criminal case in which any circuit court
has confronted the disqualification of counsel issue since the
MacDonald and Firestone decisions. The Supreme Court's reasoning in those cases strongly emphasized the policy against
piecemeal review. Influenced by this posture, the Ninth Circuit
in Greger refrained from creating another exception to the final
judgment rule.

The rule that a criminal defendant cannot immediately appeal an order disqualifying his counsel is entirely consistent with
Ninth Circuit precedent in the application of Cohen in criminal
cases. 1I9 These cases establish that the only interlocutory decicourt to disqualify attorneys if their conduct interferes with the integrity of the court or
actually produces the appearance of impropriety. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (1979).
57. 658 F.2d at 1358.
58. [d.
59. See United States v. Layton, 645 F.2d 681 (9th Cir. 1981) (claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction not immediately appealable); United States v. Wilson, 639 F.2d
500 (9th Cir. 1981) (selective prosecution claim immediately appealable); United States
v. Garner, 632 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1980) (claim of grand jury irregularities not immediately appealable); United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 863 (1980).
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sions in a criminal prosecution considered final prior to a final
judgment are those which adjudicate the defendant's right to be
free from prosecution itself.60 Unless awaiting final judgment implicates this right, the policy of expeditiously determining the
defendant's guilt or innocence militates against interlocutory review of district court orders.
The Greger panel chose not to address the broader issue of
whether a criminal defendant has a right to continuous representation of counsel throughout his trial. 61 If the court had so
concluded, immediate appellate review would arguably be required to preserve this right. However, such a decision may have
opened the door for allowing interlocutory appeals of any court
order which affects a defendant's right to counsel. In addition,
the Ninth Circuit has expressed the concern that the Cohen exception not be allowed to swallow up the final judgment rule and
abrogate the intent of Congress as expressed in section 1291.6t
As Petroleum Products points out, an order disqualifying
counsel in a civil suit operates in a vastly different context than
in a criminal prosecution. As a result, the reasoning expressed by
courts in dealing with the Cohen doctrine in criminal cases is
not always relevant to the civil context. Most importantly, the
right to be free from prosecution is inapplicable in a civil case.
Also absent from consideration in civil cases is the special need
in criminal trials for rapid administration of justice.
While both areas of the law strive for the uninterrupted administration of justice, within the civil context, courts have engaged in a balancing process to determine whether allowing interlocutory review would impede or further this goal. For
example, in Armstrong v. McAlpin 68 the Second Circuit prohib60. Whether an order impacts on such a right is not always self-evident. For example, in United States v. Griffin, 617 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 863
(1980), the Ninth Circuit held that an order denying a defendant's motion to dismi88
because of vindictive prosecution did not encompass the right to be free from prosecution itself. However, in United States v. Hollwyood Motor Car Co., 102 S. Ct. 3081
(1982), the Supreme Court disagreed. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
61. The Supreme Court appears ready to decide this issue in Slappy v. Morris, 649
F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3783 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1982)(No. 811095).
62. United States v. Garner, 632 F.2d 759, 765 (9th Cir. 1980).
63. 625 F.2d 433, 437 (2d Cir. 1980).
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ited interlocutory appeal of orders denying the disqualification
of counsel because it found that the motions were often used as
a device for delaying trial. The Fifth Circuit in Duncan u. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,e.t. held that orders disqualifying counsel are immediately appealable, noting that when
such motions are granted, the litigation is disrupted by the time
and effort required by a party to secure new counsel and familiarize him with the case.
The Petroleum Products panel nevertheless felt compelled
to deal with the apparent contradictory holding of Greger. In
determining that the Cohen doctrine applies, the court distinguished Greger on three grounds. First, in the civil context an
order disqualifying counsel is not effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment.611 The same is not true in criminal
cases: a presumption of prejudice exists because an erroneous
disqualification of a defendant's counsel implicates the sixth
amendment right to counsel. 66 A civil litigant faces the almost
insurmountable burden of proving the case was lost because he
was improperly forced to switch counsel, while a criminal defendant need only convince a reviewing court that the order was
improper to win reversal, thus obviating the need for immediate
appellate review.
The second difference is the degree of finality the order has
in the civil versus the criminal context. The court in Petroleum
Products argued that in a criminal case, the disruptive effect of
a disqualification order is strongly mitigated by the appointment
of substitute counsel if the defendant should not be able to afford new counsel. However, this position understates the value
of the attorney-client relationship in criminal cases by implying
that a criminal defendant's relationship with his particular attorney is of less significance than his civil counterpart.
Finally, Petroleum Products noted that public policy militiates against interlocutory review in criminal cases. However,
the necessity of a retrial each time a conviction is reversed is
arguably inconsistent with the policy of efficiency and expediency in the criminal justice system. The Fifth Circuit in United
64. 646 F.2d 1020, 1027 (5th Cir. 1981).
65. 658 F.2d at 1358.
66. 649 F.2d at 723 n.4.
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States v. Garcia,87 allowed a defendant to appeal his attorney's
disqualification in order to avoid the waste of scarce resources
and duplication of a retrial. In United States v. Hobson,88 the
Eleventh Circuit took a novel approach by allowing an interlocutory appeal of a disqualification order, but refusing to stay the
trial court proceedings pending appeal. In this manner, the burden of a new trial is avoided if the order is deemed erroneous,
and the prosecution in the lower court is not stalled during the
appeal.

F.

SIGNIFICANCE

The Greger decision helps define the <;ontours of a criminal
defendant's right to counsel. The decision implies that the right
to counsel does not encompass the right to a trial free from interference with the attorney-client relationship.
The Petroleum Products decision may have several ramifications. First, trial judges conscious of court congestion may now
be less willing to grant a motion to disqualify a party's counsel
knowing that denial of the motion cannot be appealed. Instead,
a judge may take the approach of issuing protective orders to
prevent the same taint that a disqualification order is aimed at
eliminating. 89 A second possible effect may be to refine the standards for when motions disqualifying counsel should be granted.
The issue may become a legal rather than a discretionary question for the trial judge. Trial court judges will thus have to adhere to the developing legal standards as appeals from the orders are taken. 70 Finally, the court's holding emphasizes the
Ninth Circuit's practical approach to the Cohen doctrine in civil
cases and confirms the narrow treatment this doctrine will re67. 517 F.2d 272, 275 (5th Cir. 1975).
68. 672 F.2d 825, 826 (11th Cir. 1982).
69. See Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d at 438·39.
70. In Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976), the court
noted that while disq\lalification orden are issued within the lower court's discretion,
courts have recently expressed "serious reservations" about whether the scope of appel.
late review is limited to finding an abuse of discretion where only a purely legal question
is at issue. The court then decided to examine the applicable ethical principles in decid·
ing the validity of the disqualification in the case. Id. at 810. Cf. In Re Gopmon, 531 F.2d
262, 266 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that an order disqualifying counsel could be reversed
only upon a showing of abuse of discretion).
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ceive in the criminal context.
Richard B. Shikman*

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE

A.

QUESTIONING THE BASIS OF THE

Feres

DOCTRINE

In Monaco u. United States,l Broudy u. United States," and
Lewis u. United States,S the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Feres
doctrine 4 which bars government liability under the Federal
Tort Claims Acta (FTCA) "for injuries to servicemen where the
injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to
service. "8
In Monaco, the Ninth Circuit held that the claimant and his
daughter could not recover under the FTCA for injuries arising
from claimant's in-service exposure to radiation even though the
injuries did not manifest themselves until after claimant left the
service.
During World War II, the claimant was stationed at the
University of Chicago where, as part of a special program, he
was required to perform calisthenic exercises in the football
field. He alleged that while involved in this program, experiments in atomic reactions were being conducted in a laboratory
beneath the stadium in connection with the "Manhattan Pro• Second year student, Golden Gate University School of Law.
1. 661 F.2d 129 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Nelson, J.; the other panel members were
Canby, J. and Battin, D.J., sitting by designation) (rehearing denied, Dec. 14, 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 2269 (1982).
2. 661 F.2d 125 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Nelson, J.; the other panel members were Skopil
and Norris, JJ.) (as amended, Dec. 21, 1981).
3. 663 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Hug, J.; the other panel members were Schroeder and Nelson, JJ.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2959 (1982).
4. The Feres doctrine was established in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950).
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b) & (c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402, 2411(b),
2412(c), 2671-2680 (1976 & Supp. 1981).
6. 340 U.S. at 146.
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ject", which developed the first atomic weapon.
The claimant was not apprised of his exposure to radiation
until 1971, when he was informed that he had cancer of the colon induced by radiation. At the same time, he learned that the
radiation had induced a genetic change which caused his daughter to be born with a birth defect resulting in brain hemmorhages, aphasia and other permanent injuries.
The claimant and his daughter brought a consolidated action under the FTCA, which waives traditional sovereign immunity and exposes the government to liability arising from personal injury or property damage caused by the negligence of any
government employee "acting within the scope of his office or
employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance
with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."7
The claimant and his daughter alleged that the Army was negligent in permitting his exposure to radiation.
In Feres v. United States, the Supreme Court established
an exception to the FTCA's waiver of immunity "for injuries to
servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of
activity incident to service."s In Stencel Aero Engineering Corp .
. v. United States,9 the Supreme Court extended the Feres exception to bar a third party's indemnity claim for damages paid to
cover service-related injuries. The Supreme Court has noted
three reasons for the military exception. First, the Court has expressed a concern with the effects of such suits on military discipline, and "the extreme results that might obtain if suits . . .
were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts in the
course of military duty."1O Second, the FTCA's reliance on the
law of the place where the negligent act occurred would lead to
inconsistent application of the law.l1 Finally, military personnel
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976).
8. 340 U.S. 135, 146.
9. 431 U.S. 666 (1977).
10. United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 100, 112 (1954). The Monaco court referred to
this concern as "the most convincing explanation for the continued vitality of the Feres
doctrine." 661 F.2d at 132.
11. In Feres, the Supreme Court stated that recovery by military personnel would
be "dependent upon geographical considerations over which they have no control and to
laws which fluctuate in existence and value." 340 U.S. 135, 143. The Court concluded
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can recover under the Veterans' Benefit Act,n which provides
"no fault" compensation as a substitute for tort liability and
limits the extent of governmental liability for service-related
injuries. 13
The claimant in Monaco relied on United States u.
Brown,14 arguing that since his cancer manifested itself after he
left the service, his injury did not arise out of activity incident to
service. lei The court rejected this argument by distinguishing
Brown, since in that case the negligent act itself occurred postservice. The court found that the proper test is not when the
injury occurred, but rather when the negligent act itself took
place. Since claimant's injury resulted directly from in-service
exposure to radiation, the court concluded that the government's negligence occurred while claimant was in the service,
even though the injury did not manifest itself until after
discharge. 16
The claimant's daughter advanced two arguments. First, she
claimed that her injury was not the result of an in-service injury
because the genetic change in her father that caused her birth
defects was no injury. The court reiterated that "the proper focus in applying the Feres doctrine is not the time of injury, but
the time of the negligent act."17 The court reasoned that it was
immaterial whether the daughter's injury occurred when she was
born with the birth defect or when her father suffered genetic
change; the allegedly negligent act took place while her father
was in the service.
Next, the daughter argued that recovery should not be
barred because she was never a member of the armed forces and
her claim has no effect on military discipline. The court noted
that the Supreme Court had rejected both aspects of this argument in Stencel. There, the Court concluded that "the effect of
the action upon military discipline is identical whether suit is
that this would "hardly be a rational plan." Id.
12. 38 U.S.C. §§ 301-1008 (1979 & Supp. 1981).
13. 661 F.2d 129, 131.
14. 348 U.S. 100 (1954). In Brown, recovery was allowed to include post-service negligent treatment of an in-service injury.
15. 661 F.2d 129, 132-33.
16. Id. at 133.
17.Id.
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brought by the soldier directly or by a third party."IS The Ninth
Circuit also rejected the daughter's argument that non-military
claimants should be entitled to recover because of their inability
to collect compensation under the Veterans' Benefit Act. In the
court's view, the fact that the daughter sought relief for an injury to herself rather than indemnity for losses due to in-service
injury to her father did "not change the substantive analysis."19
In Broudy v. United States, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that the government's failure to warn of, monitor and treat any
possible injuries arising from exposure to radiation might constitute an independent, post-service negligent act if the government learned of the danger after discharge. In 1957, while plaintiff's husband served as an officer in the Marine Corps, he was
ordered to participate in military exercises in the vicinity of two
nuclear tests conducted in Nevada. For several years after his
discharge in 1960, plaintiff's husband was treated for various
health problems at Marine medical facilities, but was not informed of or warned about the dangers associated with his exposure. In 1976, plaintiff's husband was diagnosed as having a form
of cancer that has been related to low-level radiation exposure.
One year later, he died from that disease. 2o
The court found that plaintiff was barred by Feres and its
progeny from bringing a claim for an in-service tort continuing
after discharge. However, the court stated that the government's
failure to warn plaintiff's husband of and monitor any possible
injuries arising from his exposure might constitute an independent, post-service negligent act under Brown if the government
learned of the danger after plaintiff's husband left the service. 21
18. 431 U.S. 666, 673.
19. 661 F.2d 129, 134.
20. 661 F.2d 125, 126.
21. 661 F.2d at 128-29. See Thornwell v. United States, 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C.
1979) (finding independent tort and granting recovery where government deliberately
refused to give claimant information on drug experiments performed on him in-service);
Schwartz v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 536 (E.D. Pa. 1964) (allowing recovery for failure to warn, where dangerous effects of drug administered during service not discovered
until post-service). But see Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981) (alleged failure
.0 monitor effects of chemical warfare an in-service tort, the effects of which simply remained uncorrected following discharge); Henning v. United States, 446 F.2d 774 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1972) (recovery denied for failure to inform
claimant of in-service misdiagnosis of tuberculosis); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (recovery denied where government
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In remanding the case to the district court, the Ninth Circuit
noted that plaintiff's allegations concerning the government's
knowledge were "somewhat confused" and acknowledged that
this confusion may have resulted from an inability to gain the
necessary information from the government. 22
In Lewis v. United States, the Ninth Circuit held that the
policies supporting the Feres doctrine require that courts also
bar intentional tort claims asserted against the government by
military personnel. The widow of a Marine Corps lieutenant
colonel brought a wrongful death action against the government
after her husband died in a plane crash. She alleged that the
acts or omissions of government employees in maintaining, operating and controlling the aircraft amounted to "sabotage."23
The Ninth Circuit declined to pass on the claim which
would require it to focus on the actions of the government in the
military context. The court noted that the Feres language indicated "no limitation" as to the types of injuries involved and
that the "critical determination" is the status of the plaintiff not
the status or actions of the tortfeasor.24
The Feres doctrine has been sharply criticized. The Monaco
court commented that "the basis for the exception has recently
become the subject of some confusion" and noted that several
cases in the Ninth Circuit have held the military exception applicable "even where there was no command relationship between the claimant and the tortfeasor."26 The Monaco panel was
particularly reluctant to apply the doctrine in the daughter's
case. The court stated that "[i]n her case, the price of avoiding
examination of events long past, and involving her behavior in
no respect, appears to be [a] complete denial of recovery."26
failed to warn military personnel about effects of chemical agent because there was no
separate and distinct act of post-discharge negligence).
22. 661 F.2d at 129. At one point in her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the
government learned of the dangers "subsequent to 1955 and prior to 1972"-a span that
covered the time period prior to Major Broudy's discharge in 1960. At other points, however, she alleged specifically that the government knew of the harmful effects of radiation prior to her husband's exposure. 1d.
23. 663 F.2d 889, 890.
24. 1d. at 891.
25. 661 F.2d at 132. See Troglia v. United States, 602 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. Lee, 400 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1053 (1969).
26. 661 F.2d at 134.
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The argument for barring the daugher's claim in Monaco is
attenuated. It is difficult to imagine how military discipline
would be jeopardized if claims such as that brought by the
daughter were allowed. Her claim was far removed from the
command relationship and her harm was belated and unforeseen. Nonetheless, the court felt bound by the "developed doctrine" and its broad prohibition of judicial examination of military activities, even where a third party brings a claim in his or
her own interest. 27
One commentator considers the Feres doctrine "unnecessary" and believes "[i]t deprives military personnel of redress
for harms in the name of policies that are more than adequately
fulfilled by the FTCA's 'discretionary function' exception."28
The discretionary function exception protects government
"planning" activities as opposed to those which are merely "operational".29 In Feres, a serviceman was killed when the barrack
in which he was sleeping burned down. Government negligence
was alleged in the maintenance of the heating system. Had the
Court decided the case under the "discretionary function" ex27. Id. See Van Sickel v. United States, 285 F.2d 87, 90 (9th Cir. 1960) (denying
recovery for wrongful death action found to be "original and distinct cause of action
granted to the heirs and personal representatives of the decedent to recover damages
sustained by them."); In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp.
762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (denying recovery to children claiming genetic injuries and birth
defects caused by parents' exposure to Agent Orange); Harrison v. United States, 479 F.
Supp. 529, 532-35 (D. Conn. 1979), aff'd without opinion, 622 F.2d 573 (2d Cir. 1980)
(wife's action for loss of consortium barred even though her action was "for damages to
her own interest, not a remote consequence of the tortfeasor's injury to the husband.").
28. See Note, From Feres to Stencel: Should Military Personnel Have Access to
FTCA Recovery? 77 MICH. L. REV. 1099 (1979). 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1976) provides express
exceptions to the application of the FTCA. The "discretionary function" exception
includes:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of
the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation
be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on
the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Id. at § 2680(a).
29. The distinction between "planning" activities as opposed to "operational" activities originated in Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). In Dalehite, the Supreme Court barred a claim for damages arising from the explosion of a shipload of
fertilizer manufactured in connection with a War Department project for the export of
fertilizer to devastated countries following World War II, because the alleged negligence
took place "at a planning rather than operational level." Id. at 42.
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ception, it might have found that the maintenance of the barrack's heating system was a purely operational activity and not a
matter of military judgment. Instead, the Feres Court dismissed
the claim as a service-related injury,SO thereby denying recovery
to the claimant and establishing a broad-based military
exception.
The discretionary function exception shields the government from liability for activities which are a matter of military
judgment. The exception would more than adequately guard
against the possibility that an elimination of the Feres doctrine
would open a floodgate of litigation against the military. It is
doubtful whether those claims presented in Monaco and Broudy
could survive the "discretionary function" exception. The government could argue with probable success that the Monaco
claimant's injury resulted from a governmental project in the
planning phase. The government could buttress its argument by
relying on such factors as the need for, and time restrictions on,
the research and development of the atomic bomb. In Broudy,
the government has an even stronger case under the discretionary function exception. The exception would protect decisions to
employ potentially dangerous training methods or to experiment
with the effects of certain weaponry on combat troops, since
these policy decisions in the military context fall squarely within
the "discretionary function" exception.
The military could argue another statutory exception to the
FTC A which involves intentional tort claims brought against the
government. S! In Lewis, the government argued that the plaintiff
stated a claim under one of the intentional tort theories excluded by the FTC A since the acts or omissions on the part of
government employees were characterized as "sabotage". However, the court found no need to address this issue because of
the Feres doctrine.
With the Feres doctrine left intact, the law prevents military personnel and their family members from bringing suits
against the government if the injuries or fatalities are service30. 340 U.S. 135, 146.
31. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976 & Supp. 1981). The FTCA also excludes claims arising
in foreign countries, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1976), and from combatant activities, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(g) (1976).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1983

51

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 13, Iss. 1 [1983], Art. 12

300

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:293

related. Recovery may be allowed if the plaintiff can allege and
show an independent, post-service negligent act. Injuries arising
from exposure to radiation might constitute such an act if the
government learned of the danger after discharge. Otherwise,
the only other channels of redress available are certain limited
legislative remedies. 32 The court in Monaco encouraged claimant's daughter to pursue any legislative remedies and expressed
the hope that if Congress is made aware of the seriousness of
such claims, it will be moved to grant relief, or to change the law
to allow such recoveries. 33
B.

PARROTING THE REQUIREMENTS OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 36 MAY BE CONSIDERED AN ADMISSION

In Asea v. Southern Pacific Transportation CO.,3. the Ninth
Circuit held that a response which fails to admit or deny a
proper request for admission does not comply with requirements
of federal procedural rules if the answering party does not make
a "reasonable inquiry,"3G or if information "readily attainable"36
is sufficient to enable him to admit or deny the matter. The
court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
not requiring the answering party to make an amended
response. 37
In Asea, plaintiff sued the defendant for damages and
served the defendant with a series of requests for admissions
pursuant to rule 36(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 38
32. Prior to the enactment of the FTCA, the only recourse for a citizen injured by
the negligence of a government employee was to petition Congress to pass a private bill
providing a special grant of relief. Feres, 340 U.S. at 139-40.
33. 661 F.2d at 134 n.3. In a footnote concluding its opinion, the court stated:
Perhaps if Congress is made aware of the seriousness of claims
such as [claimant's daughter] Denise's it will be moved to
grant relief to the individuals who request it, or to change the
FTCA to allow such recoveries in the federal courts. We sincerely hope Congress will do at least the former.
Id.
34. 669 F.2d 1242 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were
Wright, J. and East, D.J., sitting by designation) (rehearing and rehearing en banc denied, Mar. 8, 1982).
35. 669 F.2d at 1245.
36.Id.
37. Id. at 1247.
38. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a) (Supp. 1982) provides in part:
A party may serve upon any other party a written request for
the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the
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As to the principal factual issues, the defendant responded as
follows: "Answering party cannot admit or deny. Said party has
made reasonable inquiry. Information known or readily available
to this date is not complete. Investigation continues."s9
After plaintiff deposed more of defendant's employees, it
became convinced that defendant had in fact known the cause of
the damage claim for many months, and therefore could have
admitted or denied the requests for admissions. 40 On a motion to
have these requests ordered admitted, the defendant claimed
that its responses were proper under rule 36(a) because it did
not have first hand information. In spite of this claim, the district court granted the motion in favor of plaintiff.
On appeal, the defendant argued that its responses satisfied
rule 36(a), and, in the alternative, that the proper sanction for
the failure to make a reasonable inquiry prior to answering a
request for admission lies in an award of the expenses incurred
in proving the fact at trial, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 37(c).41
truth of any matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) set forth
in the request that relate to statements or opinions of fact or
of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of
any documents described in the request . . ..
The matter is admitted unless ... the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter ...
. The answer shall specifically deny the matter or set forth in
detail the reasons why the answering party cannot truthfully
admit or deny the matter. . . . An answering party may not
give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to
admit or deny unless he states that he has made reasonable
inquiry and that the information known or readily obtainable
by him is insufficient to enable him to admit or deny....
The party who has requested the admiBBioDB may move to
determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. . . . If
the court determines that an answer does not comply with the
requirements of this rule, it may order either that the matter
is admitted or that an amended answer be served.
39. 669 F.2d at 1244.
40. Id. at 1244-45.
41. Id. at 1245. In pertinent part, Rule 37(c) provides:
If a party fails to admit the. . . truth of any matter requested
under rule 36, and if the party requesting the admissions
thereafter proves the. . . truth of the matter, he may apply to
the court for an order requiring the other party to pay him the
reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including
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The Ninth Circuit found that "[t]he purpose of Rule 36(a)
is to expedite trial by establishing certain material facts as true
and thus narrowing the range of issues for trial. "42 A party may
not refuse to admit or deny when the information to the request
is readily available to him because a reasonable burden may be
imposed on the parties to facilitate trial. "The appropriate penalty for a party's failure to discharge that burden, however, IS
unclear. "48
The court noted three circumstances under which a request
for admission may be deemed admitted if the answer does not
comply with the requirements of the rule: (1) failure to answer
or object to a proper request for admission; (2) an evasive denial
which does not specifically deny the matter;44 and (3) a response
which does not set forth in detail the reasons why the answering
party cannot truthfully admit or deny the matter.411
Rule 36(a) states that if a party has insufficient information
to admit or deny the matter and that party has made a reasonable inquiry, it must so state. 46 The defendant argued that its anreasonable attorney's fees. . . .
42. 669 F.2d at 1245. See also Keen v. Detroit Diesel Allison, 569 F.2d 547, 554
(10th Cir. 1978); Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431, 436 (E.D. Pa.
1978).
43. 669 F.2d at 1245.
44. [d. See also United States v. Kenealy, 646 F.2d 699 (1st Cir. 1981). In Kenealy,
the defendants appealed from the granting of a summary judgment supported by "matters involuntarily admitted against them, pursuant to Rule 36." [d. at 702. The court
stated:
They do not-as they cannot-dispute that deeming matters
admitted is a proper remedy under appropriate circumstances
for intransigence during discovery. Rule 36 requires specificity,
detailed explanation when a truthful answer cannot be
framed, good faith, and fairness. Given appellants' opaque, .
generalized, and tardy denials, their failure to oppose the government's request for this relief, and their incredibly cavalier
conduct in this litigation, we decline to tamper with the district court's action, which was well within its discretion.
[d. at 702-03.
45. [d. at 1245. See Havenfield Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93 (W.D. Mo.
1973). "One cannot answer properly in the alternative but 'must comply strictly and
literally with the the terms of the statute upon peril of having [one's] response construed
to be in legal effect an admission' "). [d. at 97 (citation omitted). The court held that the
remedy for the answering party's failure to respond adequately was to order that party
to answer properly the day following the issuance of the order or to have those requests
for admissions deemed admitted. [d.
46. See supra note 38.
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swer was sufficient because it was literally in compliance with
the rule. 47 But the rule also requires that the answering party
make a reasonable inquiry into knowledge and information readily obtainable by him.4S Again, the appropriate sanction for failure to take such steps is not clear.49
The court noted that it found no case holding that a "response which includes the statement required by Rule 36(a) may
nonetheless be deemed an admission. "GO The court did find however that even when a party fails to state that it had made a
reasonable inquiry, and thus fails to comply with the requirements of the rule, the "courts generally order an amended answer rather than deem the matter admitted."Gl Some courts
have held a response to be insufficient if the answering party
47. 669 F.2d at 1246. See Adley Express Co. v. Highway Truck Drivers and Helpers,
Local No. 107, 349 F. Supp. 436 (E.D. Pa. 1972). In Adley, the court stated that "it
would appear that mere statement in the answer that the answering party has made
reasonable inquiry and that the information solicited was insufficient to enable him to
admit or deny the requested matter will suffice." 349 F. Supp. at 451-52. But the court
continued: "[w)e are not confronted with the mere statement of the union that it conducted a reasonable inquiry ... ; on the contrary, it is apparent from the answer that
the union had attempted to procure the information nece88ary to admit or deny." [d. at
452.
In Asea, there was evidence which suggested that the defendant either had "sufficient information to admit or deny the requested admi88ions at the time it submitted its
answers to [plaintiff), or that it subsequently discovered sufficient information to require
it to amend its answers." See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(e)(2)(B). However the record would not
necessarily support a finding that the defendant failed to make a reasonable inquiry. 669
F.2d at 1247.
48. The Advisory Committee's Note states:
The revised rule requires only that the answering party make
reasonable inquiry and secure such knowledge and information as are readily obtainable by him. In most instances, the
investigation will be necessary either to his own case or to
preparation for rebuttal. Even when it is not, the information
may be close enough at hand to be "readily obtainable".
48 F.R.D. at 533.
49. The Advisory Committee's Note continues: "Rule 36 requires only that the party
state that he has taken these steps. The sanction for failure of a party to inform himself
before he answers lies in the award of costs after trial, as provided in Rule 37(c)." [d. See
supra note 41.
50. 669 F.2d at 1246.
1i1. [d. See City of Rome v. United States, 450 F. Supp. 378, 383-84 (D. D.C. 1978),
afl'd, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (court ordered party to serve amended answers within five days
of the date of the order); Alexander v. Rizzo, 52 F.R.D. 235, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("If the
Court determines that the answer does not comply with the Rule it may order either
that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served.") (emphasis in original) (court ordered amended answers).
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fails to make a reasonable inquiry, but have ordered amended
answers rather than deem the matters admitted, even if the information necessary to admit or deny was readily obtainable.1I2
To this extent, courts have conditioned denials of motions to order matters admitted on the answering party's timely submission of a sufficient response. liS
With this background, the Asea court addressed the crux of
the appeal-was it proper for the district court to order the matters admitted even though the defendant's responses literally
fell within the mandates of Rule 36? The court stated that in its
view, "permitting a party to avoid admitting or denying a proper
request for admission simply by tracking the language of Rule
36(a) would encourage additional abuse of the discovery process."114 Such a response, if deemed to be adequate, would have
, the deleterious result of permitting the answering party to shield
himself from making an admission, and in most cases, from the
award of sanctions. The court reasoned that
Since a district court may order that a matter is
admitted only if an answer does not 'comply' with
the requirements of the Rule, it could be argued
that the only sanction for a party's willful disregard of its obligation to make reasonable inquiry
would be an award of the expenses of proving the
matter at trial pursuant to Rule 37(c).1111

However, such a holding would emasculate the power of the
court and reduce the litigant's obligation to make a reasonable
inquiry into the information available to him. liS The court therefore held that a response which fails to admit or deny a proper
request for admission does not comply with the requirements of
the rule if the party in fact failed to make a reasonable inquiry
or if information readily available is sufficient to enable him to
admit or deny the matter.1I7
52. [d. See Madison v. Mississippi Medicaid Comm'n, 86 F.R.D. 178, 186 (N.D.
Miss. 1980); Webb v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 81 F.R.D. 431 (E.D. Pa. 1978);
Lumpkin v. Meskill, 64 F.R.D. 673,678-80 (D.C. Conn. 1974) (answering party ordered
to make reasonable inquiry before amending response).
53. See, e.g., Lumpkin v. Meskill, 64 F.R.D. 673, 680 (D.C. Conn. 1974); Havenfield
Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93, 97 (W.D. Mo. 1973).
54. 669 F.2d at 1246.
55. [d. See supra note 41.
56. 669 F.2d at 1246-47.
57. [d. at 1247.
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If a propounding party feels that the answering party has

not exercised its duty to make a reasonable inquiry in good
faith, he may move to have the court determine the sufficiency
of the answer, compel a proper response, or have the matter ordered admitted. The court noted that a district court should
ordinarily first order an amended answer, and deem the matter
admitted only if a sufficient answer is not timely filed. It added
that the severe sanction of ordering a matter admitted still lies
within the sound discretion of the district court and could be
imposed when it is demonstrated that a party has intentionally
disregarded the obligations imposed by Rule 36(a).118
Applying this standard, the court found that the trial court
deemed admitted certain key matters to the case although the
trial record did not disclose any evidence showing that the defendant had failed to make a reasonable inquiry or that information readily obtainable was sufficient to allow it to admit or deny
the particular requests. liS The court vacated the order and remanded for the limited purpose of reconsideration of the order
deeming the requests admitted and the filing of appropriate
findings of fact.60
Asea v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co. serves as a
warning to attorneys to keep in mind the boundaries of their
good faith posture with respect to their duty of reasonable inquiry. The defendant in Asea was fortunate in that the district
court did not properly support with facts its findings of law. Mter Asea however, even a questionable breach of the duty of reasonable inquiry may support an order deeming these requests
admitted.

58. [d. See David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412, 418 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[bJy the very
nature of its language, sanction imposed under Rule 37(b) must be left to the sound
discretion of the trial judge."), quoting Von Brimer v. Whirlpool Corp., 536 F.2d 838, 844
(9th Cir. 1976); Herrin v. Blackman, 89 F.R.D. 622, 623 (W.O. Tenn. 1981) (magistrate
erred as a matter of law in holding that defendant's failure to file response to request for
admissions within prescribed time resulted in automatic conclusion that requests would
be deemed admitted).
59. 669 F.2d at 1247.
60. Id.
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